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Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: 
Dependency, Eugenics, and the 
Law of Marriage in the 
United States, 1860-1920 
Matthew J. Lindsay 
Between the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, American state legis-
latures enacted a series of new laws that delineated a class of citizens who 
were deemed ineligible to participate in the institution of marriage. Scholars 
have characterized this development as evidence that lawmakers had lost faith 
in a laissez-faire approach to nuptial governance, and thus transformed mar-
riage into an object of public regulation. This essay argues that behind the 
ostensible nuptial privatism of the mid-nineteenth century lay a self-conscious 
policy. of judicial governance. Judges invoked the language of nuptial privacy 
and the common law of contract strategically to advance their vision of moral 
and economic discipline. The new marital prohibitions thus represented, the 
essay argues, not the expansion of the state's police power into the previously 
private realm of domestic relations, but rather a critical transformation in 
how nuptial reformers and lawmakers understood the relationship between 
marriage and the well-being of the polity. 
Fueled by growing concerns about pauperism, the racial character of the 
urban proletariat, and the collapse of the economically independent single-
male-breadwinner household, the changing form of nuptial governance sig-
naled a thoroughgoing intellectual and strategic reorientation from an under-
standing of marriage as forming economically and morally viable 
households-the fundamental units of society-to an understanding of mar-
riage as a largely procreative institution, as the literal source of the citizenry. 
This reconceptualization of marriage underwrote a strategy of nuptial gov-
ernance that mobilized marriage as a strategy in the state's regulation of so-
cial reproduction. 
Matthew J. Lindsay is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at the University 
of ChiC;'Igo. For their valuable insights and criticisms, he is grateful to the members of the 
Social History Workshop at the University of Chicago, to Scott Lien, Bill Novak, Amy Dru 
Stanley, and especially to Kim Reilly. 
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In the 1882 edition of his landmark Treatise on the Law of Husband and 
Wife, James Schouler authoritatively summarized the dominant wisdom of 
postbellum Americans writing about marriage. He postulated that the insti-
tution of marriage was vital to the well-being of society because it served 
three indispensable functions. First, marriage created the family unit, which 
provided for the material "maintenance of offspring" and women, and thus 
protected the public against dependents. Second, Schouler advised, mar-
riage "necessarily [afforded] a discipline to both sexes" by permitting "sexual 
indulgence ... under healthy restraints." Finally, he wrote, marriage pro-
vided for the "proper nurture" of children, "and for the education in tum of 
the whole human race." Because the institution represented the bedrock of 
society, his generation believed, it ought to be the "policy of every govern-
ment ... to encourage matrimony" (Schouler 1882, 14, 15, 16). This vision 
of marriage was dramatically reshaped, in public and academic discourse and 
in the law, between the postbellum period and the First World War. 
Whereas in the Victorian Era the American judiciary-then the principle 
custodians of marriage-considered virtually all unions to be inherently 
beneficial to society, Progressive Era reformers, social scientists, and policy-
makers across the political and ideological spectrum believed that many 
marriages threatened the health of the polity. 
Between the last decade of the nineteenth century and the 1920s, 
American state legislatures passed a momentous series of new laws that dra-
matically circumscribed who was eligible to participate in the institution of 
marriage. The Connecticut legislature led the way in 1895, prohibiting 
"feebleminded, imbecilic, and epileptic men and women under 45 years of 
age" from marrying. Similar legislation was then adopted throughout the 
nation (Vernier 1931, 191-95). By 1929, 29 states barred "imbeciles," "idi-
ots," "lunatics," the "feebleminded," and those of "unsound mind" from 
marriage (Grossberg 1985, 150). Affliction with venereal disease likewise 
frequently rendered one ineligible for marriage. By 1929, 19 states made 
venereal disease a bar to marriage, and 10 of those required a health certifi-
cate from a physician to obtain a marriage license (Vernier 1931, 200-202). 
Nineteenth-century courts had recognized some types of mental and physi-
cal incompetence as grounds for prohibiting or annulling marriages. The 
Progressive Era legislation, however, signaled not only a massive statutory 
expansion in the number and scope of nuptial restrictions, but also a dis-
tinct shift in emphasis toward prohibiting the transmission of what reform-
ers, social scientists, and policymakers regarded as hereditary deficiencies. 
Historians and legal scholars have generally characterized this explo-
sion of legislation, as well as the accompanying multitude of nuptial solem-
nization and licensing requirements, as an expansion of state police power 
in the interest of public policy. In the context of the economic destabiliza-
tion of the family under the industrial wage system, the rising divorce rate, 
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falling birth rate, and the loosening of traditional gender roles within the 
family, historians argue, policymakers lost faith in privatist, laissez-faire ap-
proaches to the formation of marriage. Around the tum of the century, fears 
of the transmission of hereditary defects to future generations likewise be-
came powerful enough to undermine what one scholar has characterized as 
the "social confidence in nuptial privatism that had been a pillar of liberal 
marriage law and the aversion to state intervention" (Grossberg 1985, 150). 
These social and biological fears, historians contend, fueled the state's ex-
pansion of its regulatory purview, drawing the legal inception of marriage 
out of its refuge in the private domain of the common law of contract and 
transforming it into a full public status. As the regulatory state expanded its 
authority into the traditional patriarchal household, scholars maintain, in-
dividuals within the family developed distinct legal identities, and thus bore 
a more "immediate" relationship to the state (Grossberg 1985, 24-27).1 
These interpretations of the transformation of American marriage law 
at the tum of the century overlook the continuous presence of the regula-
tory state in the formation of marriages between the period of supposed 
nuptial privatism in the early- and mid-nineteenth century and the dra-
matic new marital prohibitions imposed by legislatures in the Progressive 
Era. Throughout the nineteenth century, this essay argues, the formation of 
marriages was the subject of deliberate, public policy-conscious legislative 
and, especially, judicial construction. The question, then, is not "why did 
the state become involved in regulating the legal inception of marriages 
toward the end of the nineteenth century?"; rather, it is "why did reformers 
and policymakers believe that the mode of the state's regulation of marriage 
required reconstruction?" By examining not only discrete legal develop-
ments, but also a cluster of larger scientific, philanthropic, racial, and gen-
der discourses in which the transformation of the law was embedded, this 
1. See also Mintz 1989; Keller 1977; Mintz and Kellogg 1988. Peter Bardaglio similarly 
argues that during Reconstruction, southern courts looked to an "increasingly accepted view 
of marriage as a legal status, rather than simply a contract, to uphold the power of each state 
to determine marital capacity" in order to reinforce the racial and sexual boundaries between 
whites and former slaves (Bardaglio 1995, 183). A relative paucity of scholarship examines 
the regulation of the formation of marriages. However, a sizable body of scholarship analyzes 
attempts to reform the common law marriage status, through married women's property and 
earnings legislation, and through women's assertion of th\!ir constitutional rights and celebra-
tion of contract models of individual autonomy. On property and earnings reform see Basch 
1982; Chused 1992a, 1992b; Lebsock 1992; Siegel 1994a, 1994b; Stanley 1988. On the use of 
rights discourse see DuBois 1987; Clark 1990. Much of this work is oriented around the ques-
tion of the extent to which married women's property and earnings reforms relieved wives 
from the legal and economic disabilities they suffered under the common law doctrine of 
marital unity. Reva Siegel, among others, has rejected the traditional "status to contract" 
interpretation of family law history by arguing convincingly that rather than overturning the 
common law of marital status, nineteenth-century courts interpreted the property and earn-
ings statutes in a manner that modernized the values of coverture in accordance with the 
gender mores of the industrial era. In so doing, she argues, the courts naturalized through the 
gendered division of marital labor one of the most essential aspect of marital status law-the 
husband's right to claim the value of his wife's services. See Siegel 1994b. 
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essay argues that it was not the state's willingness to regulate the marriage 
contract that changed, but rather legislators' and judges' conceptions of the 
potential relationship between marriage and the well-being of the polity. 
The successful late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century campaign 
to formalize the procedures through which marriages were created and to 
tighten restrictions on exactly who was eligible for marriage represented in 
large part the state's response to the challenges that the industrial reorgani-
zation of labor and the household posed to the id~al of the economically 
independent, single-male-breadwinner family.2 An emerging body of scien-
tific and popular thought about the hereditary transmission of mental and 
physiological "deficiencies" furnished marriage reformers, legislators, jour-
nalists, and judges with a language and set of concepts that enabled them.to 
avoid directly confronting the contradiction between the highly valued 
ideal of a republic of self-sufficient family units headed by economically 
independent men on the one hand, and the social consequences of capital-
ist economic development on the other. In turn, reformers and policymak-
ers transformed marriage into a largely procreative institution-the 
hereditary wellspring of the national population. As nuptial reformers, pub-
lic health advocates, and lawmakers defined what constituted hereditary 
"fitness," moreover, their class and ethnic fears explicitly shaped their judg-
ment of precisely whci was incapable of parenting an advancing civilization.3 
With its inherent viability as a foundational social institution in doubt, the 
marriage relation was' thus reformulated in legislatures, courts, and public 
discussion to serve society largely as a strategy of selective breeding-not as 
2. This perceived breakdown of the traditional regulatory functions of poor and working-
class households contributed to what Michel Foucault has characterized as the conceptual 
emergence of the "domain of population." Population, he writes, involves "a range of intrin-
sic, aggregate effects, phenomena that are irreducible to those of the family," and encompasses 
a host of economic, moral, and medical concerns. The family takes on a transformed role as 
an important source of "individualizing knowledge" about, and as a privileged instrument in 
the governance of, the population-the new primary object of government and police power. 
(1991, 1979). The ominous elements of the urban population, chief among which was the 
economic and moral threat posed by an ever-expanding army of paupers, would thus be man-
aged through a strategy of governance that wielded the family as one of its principle mecha-
nisms of control. As a mediator between the state and the population, the family was central 
to the efforts of reformers to deflect potential challenges to the prevailing economic order 
(Donzelot 1997). On the post-Revolutionary construction of male republican freedom and 
independence, see Wood 1991; Kerber 1980; Bloch 1987. On the importance of household 
relations of feminized dependency to the nineteenth-century reconstruction of male "inde-
pendence," see Stanley 1996; Blackmar 1989; McCurry 1995. On the ideological significance 
of abolitionist thought and slave emancipation to the construction of the "freedom" and per-
sonal "independence" of male wage earners, see Davis 1975; Walters 1978; Montgomery 1981; 
Stanley 1988, 1992. 
3. On the emergence of eugenics in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, 
see Kevles 1985; Degler 1991; Haller 1963; Willrich 1998. For an intriguing analysis of the 
relation between discourses of political economy and the process of racialization in the con-
text of post-emancipation Jamaica, see Holt 1992. 
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the end of public policy in and of itself, but as an instrument of the state in 
its governance of the citizenry. 
By focusing on the formation of marriages rather than the internal 
structure of the marriage status, as other scholars have, this essay offers a 
new perspective on the judicial use of contract in nineteenth-century mar-
riage law. Contract doctrine was certainly, as scholars have demonstrated, a 
potential, though largely unrealized, "antidote" to the common law of cov-
erture-that is, a source of opposition to husbands' historical status-based 
property right in the value of their wives' labor.4 The invocation of contract 
in decisions determining the validity of disputed marriages was also, I argue, 
a strategy that judges used to effectuate what they believed to be the public 
benefits of the marriage status. In this sense, then, the strategic application 
of contract doctrine worked to underwrite a significant aspect of the mar-
riage status: female economic dependency. By examining the logic and mo-
tives of often successful campaigns to regulate the formation of marriages 
through new legislation, this essay explores the social and regulatory mean-
ing of marriage in an age when confidence in the intrinsic moral and eco-
nomic viability of the household was eroding among many reformers and 
policymakers. 
The essay is organized into three sections. The first demonstrates that 
long before the regulatory boom of the Progressive Era, judges considered 
the marriage relation to be an appropriate object of public 'policy and cus-
tomarily invoked the language of private contract to serve what they per-
ceived to be distinctly public ends. The second section argues that during 
the 1870s and 1880s the judicial construction of legislation regulating the 
creation of marriages marks the beginning of the shift in the public-policy 
conception of marriage-from a relation that should be aggressively pro-
moted to a privilege that should be conscientiously guarded. The third sec-
tion discusses the construction of the hereditarily "fit" citizen after the tum 
of the century. It examines the legal, academic, public, and scientific dis-
courses that aggressively defined the ideal of American citizenship in ac-
cordance with eugenically inspired notions of race and class. It then 
demonstrates how that ideal was codified by state legislatures in a new series 
of nuptial prohibitions, and how the new regulations were received in 
American courts. 
4. See note 2. 
546 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 
THE PUBLIC POLICY OF CONTRACT: JUDICIAL 
REGULATION OF MARRIAGE IN THE 
• 1 
MID~NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Long before the Progressive Era expansion of nuptial regulations, 
American judges and legal-treatise writers consistently and unequivocally 
defined the marriage relation as a public status that was of vital interest 'to 
society and, as such, an appropriate object of state regulation. Posrbelitim 
jurists took great pains to distinguish the "mature" marriage rehition-the 
relation that existed once a valid marriage had been formed-from 'the din 
contract through which one entered that relation. Joel Bishop, orie the most 
widely cited treatise writers of the nineteenth century, characterized the 
"contract of marriage" as simply a "gateway to the marriage 'status" (Bishop 
1864, 145). Though two parties must enter into marriage through'a ci~ij 
contract, wrote a Kentucky court, "it is nevertheless su,i generis, and,unlik~ 
ordinary or commercial contracts, is publici juris; because it establishes fun-
damental and most important domestic relations" (Maciuire v. Mai~ire 
1838, 183).5 As "the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized soei~ty," 
argued a Scottish judge whom Bi~hop cited approvingly, ~arriage "s~ould 
not be left to the discretion or caprice of the contracting parties, but ShOllld 
be regulated in many important particulars by the laws of every civ!li~ea 
country" (Bishop 1864, 7).6 
Although the specters of "racial amalgamation," Mormon polygamy, 
and incest represented significant enough threats to the social order for 
postbellum legislatures and courts to restrict nuptial eligibility, the prevailing 
judicial policy was to aggressively promote the cre~tion of new marriages.7 
Because the marriage relation was of such vital importance to the well-being 
and stability of society, Bishop wrote, "the presumption both of law and fact 
5. Case quoted in Bishop 1864, 7. 
6. See also Schouler 1882, 19-20; Stewart 1887, 5-6. . . 
7. Postbellum legislatures and courts did indeed exercise their regulatory power by im-
posing and enforcing laws prohibiting bigamy, consanguineous unions, and most signific~ntly, 
miscegenation. During and immediately following the Civil War, 10 states passed new laws 
prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages, thus joining the 14 states with similar laws 
already on the books (COrt 1995; Bardaglio 1995). Such unions were usually declared void ab 
initio by statute, as opposed to merely voidable. ("A marriage is termed void when it is good 
for no legal purpose" [Bishop 1864, 89], "but a voidable marriage is valid for all civil purposes 
until a competent tribunal has pronounced the sentence of nullity" [Schouler 1882, 22)). 
Even when a statute contained no express clause of nullity, courts interpreted it to render 
marriages in violation of the ban absolutely void (Schouler 1882, 27). Similar statutes declar-
ing bigamous marriages null and void were held constitutional by the U.'S. Supreme Court 
(Cort 1995, 116-17). Consanguineous unions were likewise rendered void Gb initio through 
legislation in many states, though the common law held them merely'voidable (Bishop 1864, 
104, 270). Though marriage was "considered in law a civil contract," declared the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, it "has been regulated by legislative enactments by defining the character and 
relation of the parties who may marry, so as to prevent a conflict of duties and to preserVe the 
purity of families" Uones v. Jones 1872, 21; and see Francois v. State 1880; State v. Kennedy 
1877; State v. Ross 1877; State v. Gibson 1871). 
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should be. carried to the very verge to uphold a marriage." Courts aggres-
sively applied the "well-recognized maxim, Semper prcesumitur pro rna-
trimonio"-always presume marriage (Bishop 1864; 11). Because the very 
'sqlbllity of the, state rested on the marriage relation, Bishop later wrote, 
"prirna facie . .. each particular marriage is beneficial to the public" (Bishop 
18~1, 16). A Mississippi court expounded on Bishop's conception of the 
import~nce of marriage to the public interest: "The superstructure of society 
'rests .upon'marriage and the family as its foundation. The social relations 
~md ~he rights of property spring out of it, and attach to it, such as dower, 
administration, distribution and inheritance. All controversies therefore, 
growing, out of marriage, assume the dignity of quasi public questions." The 
law, the court insisted, strongly presumed the validity of a disputed mar-
riag~, and placed a very heavy burden of proof on the party challenging its 
l~gality (Wilkie v. Collins 1873, 510-11).8 By validating informal, common 
law, unions, by refusing to void marriages formed in violation of statutory 
requirements, and by drastically limiting the conditions under which mar-
riage'could be a~mulled, mid- and late-nineteenth-century courts advanced 
it vision of th~ marriage relation as an intrinsically desirable end of public 
policy. By consistently presuming and preserving the validity of disputed 
unions or, in some instances, by dissolving them, American courts in effect 
legitimized and provided for children, saved women. from unchastity and 
men .from licentiousness, and guarded the state against the burden of finan-
cial·dependents. 
, One of the primary policy aims of nineteenth-century courts was to 
prevent sexual promiscuity by legally ensuring the satisfaction of sexual 
de~ir~s within marriage. "The natural indulgence of natural desire," Bishop 
suggested, and the "prevention of adulterous intercourse," were among the 
greatest p~blic ends of matrimony (Deane v, Aveling 1845, 299).9 Judges 
thus .invariably held impotence to he grounds for annulment. "If a party is 
I 
permanently unfit for sexual intercourse," one jurist wrote, "he or she is not 
competent to marry." .Moreover, he continued, "tl:ie defect must be one of 
copulation, not·of reproduction, for barrenness in no way invalidates a mar-
riage"(Stewart 1887, 53, 55). A New York court found, for example, that 
the "possession of organs necessary to conception cannot, as a matter of law, 
be held essential to capacity to enter into the marriage state ... so long as 
there is no impediment to the indulgence of the passions incident to this 
'state;' (Wendel v, Wendel 1898, 72). The capacity to sexually indulge one's 
spouse, and decidedly not the capacity for procreation, this court declared, 
lay at the essence of marriage. To deny a petition for annulment because of 
impotence would place the innocent party in a state of "constant tempta-
8, See'also Hull v, Rawls 1854; Cole v, Langley 1859; Askew v, Dupree 1860; Philadelphia 
v, ,Williamson 1873; Teter v, Teter 1884; Cartwright et. al. v, McGown 1887, 
·9, Case quoted in Bishop 1864, 276, 
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tion," generating "the probable consequence of other [extramarital] connec-
tions" (Deane v. Aveling 1845, 299). 
In order to stave off the adulterous promiscuity that would result from 
such unfortunate unions, courts voided truly "unconsummated" marriages 
upon petition by constructing them as broken contracts. In an 1870 suit for 
divorce, a Maryland court determined upon surgical examination that due 
to "a very imperfect development of the sexual organs," a woman was capa-
ble of "only incipient and imperfect coition." The court concluded that "it 
is well settled that if by reason of malformation or organic defect at the time 
of marriage, there cannot be natural and perfect coition, vera copula, be-
tween the parties," and if the condition is "permanent and incurable," the 
case "comes within the legal definition of impotence and is cause for nullity 
of marriage" (J. G. v H. G. 1870,401).\0 Again, mere infertility was not 
considered fraud. The capacity to accommodate sexual indulgence, not the 
capacity to procreate, was held to lie at the essence of the marriage contract. 
The courts conceived of marriage as a vitally important public institution 
that functioned as a bulwark against promiscuity, and they frequently mobil-
ized the "neutral" doctrine of contract in order to help the relation serve its 
purpose. I I 
In their desire to control promiscuity, however, postbellum courts usu-
ally strove to create rather than to dissolve marriages. Judges frequently le-
gitimated potentially illicit sexual relations by conferring the status of 
marriage on the couple. American courts consistently applied the rule that a 
marriage contract may be entered into per verba de futuro cum copula. An 
Illinois court explained the rule as it was frequently understood and applied: 
"Where the parties competent to contract agreed to marry at some future 
time," Judge Shope declared, "if they have copula, which is lawful only in 
the married state," that act "will be presumed to have been allowed on the 
faith of the marriage promise, and that the parties, at the time of such cop-
ula, accepted each other as man and wife." The court presumed that in the 
context of an agreement to marry sometime in the future, sexual intercourse 
constituted present consent to enter into a contract of marriage. By com-
mitting an act that was unlawful outside marriage, the court reasoned, the 
couple "will be presumed ... to have changed their future promise to marry, 
to one of present marriage" (Cartwright v. McGown 1887, 399). Through 
10. See also Devanbaugh v. Devanbaugh 1836; Meyer v. Meyer 1875. "A contract of mar-
riage," Bishop wrote, "implies that the parties are capable of consummating it." Accordingly, 
under common law the impotent party who, aware of his or her incapacity, nevertheless con-
tracts marriage, "commits a gross fraud and grievous injury." Even if the contracting party is 
ignorant of his or her deficiency, Bishop wrote, the marriage would nevertheless be held 
voidable because "there is equally a violation of the contract" (1864, 272-73). 
11. In her discussion of two late-nineteenth-century U.S. Supreme Court cases, Nancy 
Cott (1995) has similarly concluded that the Court characterized marriage as a contract when 
the validity of a common law marriage was in question. 
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the application of this rule, the court in effect conferred marriage, and thus 
morality, on a potentially illicit act. 12 
In the nineteenth century the idea of contract represented both a fun-
damental·legal doctrine and a potent economic and cultural metaphor for 
relations of mutual obligation and exchange. Exactly when judges invoked 
the common law of contract, however, as well as what its application in a 
particular case meant in practice were left largely to the discretion of the 
courts. In this respect, then, contract functioned as a kind of doctrinal tem-
plate that enabled courts to organize a couple's "matrimonial" behavior-
including cohabitation as well as sexual and economic exchange-into a 
narrative of private consent to marry. Bishop confirmed the moral and so-
cial value of presuming such consent in cases of per verba de futuro cum 
copula. Not to apply the doctrine, he charged, would be to inflict "the dis-
grace of concubine" on a virtuous woman, and to allow "some slip in the 
form of marriage ... [to make] her a sort of select strumpet." "All inter-
course between the sexes in its. nature matrimonial should be such in fact," 
he wrote, and "the law, when administered by enlightened judges, seizes 
upon all presumptions both of law and of fact, and presses into its service all 
things which can help it in each particular case to sustain the marriage, and 
repel the conclusion of unlawful commerce" (Bishop 1864, 16-17,394).13 
American courts curbed illicit sexual relations, in short, by applying a rule 
of present consent that rendered such relations matrimonial. 
During much of the nineteenth century, the moral and economic 
dimensions of marriage and the home existed ideologically as two sides of 
the same coin. When courts legitimated disputed marriages they were both 
acting in consonance with and underwriting the prevailing middle-class 
gender ideology that explicitly linked married women's moral virtue to their 
economic dependency. The ideology of separate spheres arose concurrent 
with, and was functionally linked to, market expansion, the rise of wage 
labor, and the movement of men's labor outside of the home. Historians 
have convincingly argued that the image of the home as a domestic sanctu-
ary, or refuge, protected from the competitive and hostile world of economic 
exchange and characterized by the selfless moral virtue of a housewife and 
mother, helped to legitimate market relations by locating social morality in 
the domestic sphere. It was precisely the economic dependency of women, 
their ostensibly "disinterested" separation from the world of commerce and 
12. See also Port v. Port 1873; Richard v. Brehm 1873. Because the law presumes inno-
cence in cases where the facts are "equally susceptible to two constructions," Bishop wrote, by 
connecting the "consent de futuro with [an equivocal copula], and making of the two a present 
consent, the copula becomes moral and legal, which would otherwise be immoral and illegal." 
Instead of concluding that a couple had violated "decency and morality and law," he contin-
ued, the law presumes present consent to marriage when a man and a woman "yield ... 
themselves" to what is "lawful only in ... [the marriage] relation" (Bishop 1864, 212, 216). 
13. Emphasis added. See also Askew v. Dupree 1860, 189, 190. 
550 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 
politics, moreover, that insured the affectionate, morally regenerative qual-
ity of the home (Cott 1977; Ryan 1981; Stanley 1996; Bloch 1987).14 For 
judges and other middle-class and elite Americans, therefore, the ideology 
of separate spheres represented a model not only of gender roles, but of 
social and economic organization more generally. This model lay at the 
center of a historically longstanding worldview that envisioned an Ameri-
can population that was economically and morally contained within and 
disciplined by independent, male-headed household units. It was this 
worldview that animated courts' aggressive creation of legal, legitimate 
families. 
In practice, guarding the virtue of women was frequently inextricable 
from preserving support for widows and insuring the legitimacy of and rights 
of inheritance for children. Courts were especially determined to ensure 
that economic dependents were provided for. In cases involving inheritance 
rights, the presumption of marriage was aggressively invoked. An Indiana 
court explicitly acknowledged this form of judicial activism in an 1884 case 
to determine the validity of an informal marriage, in order to settle the 
estate of a deceased man. "The presumption in favor of marriage and the 
legitimacy of children," the court ruled, "is one of the strongest known to 
the law, and in favor of a child asserting its legitimacy this applies with particular 
force." In such cases the burden of proof was laid heavily on the party chal-
lenging the validity of a marriage. A child who "is asserting his mother's 
innocence over evil, and maintaining his right to property acquired by his 
father," the court declared, is "in a position to insist upon a full and broad 
application of the rule that 'the law presumes morality, and not immorality; 
marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy'" (Teter .v. 
Teter 1884, 138).15 If the ideology of separate spheres held that a woman's 
14. The concept of "separate spheres," it should be noted, operated principally as an 
ideology, rather that an accurate characterization of most nineteenth-century households. 
Most women were, in fact, infinitely more involved in some form of domestic production or 
commerce than the image of spheres suggests. See Boydston 1990; Kerber 1988. 
15. Emphasis added. See also Cartwright v. McGown 1887, 396, in which the court 
stated that every "reasonable and fair presumption will be indulged for the purpose of uphold-
ing a marriage, and establishing the legitimacy of the offspring"; Hull v. Rawls 1854; Hender-
son v. Cargill et al. 1856; Cole v. Langley 1859. It is important to note that such judicial 
interpretations were understood by the courts to serve the needs not only of the parties in-
volved, but the larger public end of protecting and strengthening the American state. An 
1873 case to determine whether alimony and child support were owed forcefully demonstrates 
judges' conception of the national policy scope of the decisions validating disputed marriages. 
In Philadelphia v. Williamson the defendant had participated in a Catholic marriage ceremony 
in Ireland 16 years earlier, with the woman who was suing him for support. After immigrating 
to the United States and having seven children together, the defendant claimed that he and 
the plaintiff had never been lawfully married because a 1746 English law forbade the inter-
marriage of a Papist and a Protestant, which he claimed to have always been. 
The court declared that in a case in which it is argued "that the children of these parties 
are bastards, and their mother nothing more than a concubine," the burden is on the defend-
ant to "very clearly establish" that to enforce the English law would "not be to destroy that 
policy of our own government ... [and] carry havoc and ruin into many a virtuous house-
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economic dependency was necessary to ensure her moral virtue, in the prac-
tical logic of many nineteenth-century judges the presumption of virtue be-
came a necessary legal prerequisite for her economic protection. 
An 1868 Pennsylvania inheritance case, De Amarelli's Estate, 
powerfully illustrates the way in which American courts strategically in-
voked both contract doctrine and the rule of favoring the presumption of 
innocence and legality. In De Amare!li's Estate, Catherine Vincent, who 
claimed to be the widow of Vincent De Amarelli, argued that she and the 
deceased had been secretly married for several years before his death, during 
which time she had given birth to their three children. Because De 
Amarelli was a highly regarded professor at the University of Pennsylvania, 
while Vincent was originally a servant at the boardinghouse where De 
Amarelli lived, she maintained, the couple lived apart in order to protect 
her husband's social and professional standing. De Amarelli supported her at 
a boardinghouse for several years, where he visited her for periods of several 
hours between one and three times a week. When they were together, wit-
nesses agreed, the couple conducted themselves as though they were mar-
ried, though De Amarelli assumed a false name. De Amarelli never revealed 
to his friends or colleagues that he was married, and referred to Vincent in 
his will by name, rather than as his wife. 
Throughout the decision Judge Agnew aggressively guarded Catherine 
Vincent's moral virtue. The court reiterated several times that "there is not 
a spark of evidence against her purity, and not a breath of suspicion had 
sullied her reputation previous to her reputed marriage." In response to the 
charge that her relation with De Amarelli began illicitly, and in justifica-
tion of the fact that Vincent herself did not attempt to account for the 
origin of their relation in her testimony, Agnew took it upon himself to 
construct a scenario explaining how the couple had secretly entered into 
the marriage status as a precondition of sexual intercourse. He speculated 
that "lust may have fired [De Amarelli'sl purpose at first, but [under] the 
well-known influence of her religion, and the guards it throws around Cath-
hold." The defendant failed to make his case. Because "marriage is universally regarded as the 
foundation stone of all the social relations," without which "the social fabric falls into ruins," 
the court declared, "a law which would bastardize issue ... could not be tolerated in the 
United States." "We shall not be told," the court continued indignantly, "that a husband and 
father" may enter this country with his wife and children, and then "deliberately turn them all 
out upon the cold charity of the world." To recognize the English law would "tend to debase 
public morals, and introduce a test utterly at war with a fundamental principle of American 
government." The court pronounced with patriotic fervor that if "this nation, in the strength 
of its manhood, is to be respected," it must "emphatically declare that upon the subject of 
marriage, and especially its destruction, it will determine every case by its own enlightened 
principles of morals and of public policy." The court concluded the decision rather personally. 
"It gives me great judicial satisfaction," Judge Ludlow scathingly wrote, "to make this faithless 
husband and father, who did not hesitate in fact to brand his own offspring in an open court 
of justice as a bastard, to understand that justice is administered" in the United States (Phila-
delphia v. Williamson 1873, 177, 178, 179). 
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olic females of her rank, ... his desires finally drove him into a proposal of 
marriage consummated privately." With great generosity of imagination, the 
court in effect cloaked a potentially illicit intercourse in the language of 
nuptial privacy. When De Amarelli's "approaches were first made," Agnew 
reasoned, "they were not probably in the presence of witnesses, and when 
he concluded to marry, it is not likely his design would be published." The 
very privacy of the relation, in short, permitted the court to imagine the 
possibility of present consent, which enabled it to confer marriage. By treat-
ing marriage as a private contract, requiring no publicity, formal solemniza-
tion, or documentation for its validity, the court constructed a scenario 
that, in spite of "whatever doubts may be suggested ... ought not and can-
not convert an acknowledged wife into a mistress, and innocent offspring 
into bastards" (De Amarelli's Estate 1868, 288, 293). 
Ultimately, the determination of wheth.er Catherine Vincent was a 
wife or a "concubine" had dramatic economic implications. The court's de-
cision to confer virtue on her was necessarily a determination that she was a 
widow, entitled to an inheritance as such, and that her children were legiti-
mate and thus De Amarelli's legal heirs. To declare the relation meretri-
cious, in short, would have been to deny Vincent and her three children a 
source of private economic support. Judge Agnew's interpretation of De 
Amarelli's will powerfully suggests his understanding of the marriage rela-
tion as one of female and filial economic dependency. In an 1860 codicil to 
his will, De Amarelli gave Vincent $500; but three years later, "after the 
birth of his second child," recalled the court, "and as years had cemented 
their union, which in the beginning might have been the result of uncon-
querable desire," he raised the endowment to $3,000. "Surely this looks 
rather like the gift of growing affection for a wife," the court reasoned, 
"than the improbable lavish of one upon his mistress, after appetite and 
desire quenched." In this case, Judge Agnew's conception of the proper eco-
nomic dynamic of the marriage relation, as opposed to a mere sexual ex-
change, moved him to confer marriage on a relation that he understood to 
be serving the function of matrimony. The judicial policy goal of providing 
for widows and children was in this sense self-enabling: Judge Agnew inter-
preted a relation he perceived to be serving the personal and social func-
tions of marriage as evidence of an actual marriage; this determination, in 
turn, ensured that the relation would continue to function in the service of 
desired policy ends. This interpretation is supported, moreover, by the 
court's incessant reiteration of its unwillingness to "pronounce [Vincent] a 
mistress and her children bastards" (De Amarelli's Estate 1868, 295, 296). 
The decision succinctly encapsulated how the court appealed to the 
doctrine of contract to advance its vision of appropriate sexual morality and 
economic provision: 
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Mystery may surround its origin; suspICiOn may linger in its circum-
stances, and slight doubt disturb its clearness, but the policy of the 
State demands that this relation should not be slightly discredited and 
the issue bastardized. This is necessary in this country, where marriage 
is a civil contract, and often unattended by ceremony, or performed by 
a single officiating witness: (1'868, 297) 
It was the very privacy of the' ~lationship in question, therefore, that ena-
bled the court to construct a nari~tive of mutual consent to marry.16 More-
over, it was through the language of private contract that judges often 
executed their most aggressive, sel(conscious policy interventions. Judicial 
decisions in cases involving the di'sputed validity of marriages demonstrate 
that nineteenth-century courts' reliance on the common law of contract did 
not necessarily translate into a laissez-faire approach to society. Rather, the 
language of the decisions reveals a'judiciary that explicitly understood itself 
to be drawing strategically on contract doctrine to make and execute public 
policy it believed served the interests of the society and state. 17 
FROM FAMILY TO POPULATION: NUPTIAL 
SOLEMNIZATION AND THE CHANGING 
INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE MARRIAGE RELATION 
By the Gilded Age, the vision of society that had animated the judicial 
practice of creating families through the strategic invocation of contract 
doctrine was growing increasingly untenable. As widespread poverty and 
dependence on public and private charity soared in the 1870s, and as the 
increasing visibility of women in the wage labor force shook the material 
and ideological foundation of marriage, the "protective" a~pects of marriage 
seemed to contemporaries to be eroding among wage earners (Stanley 
1988).18 
16. The concept of "marital privacy" was wielded instrumentally by nineteenth-century 
judges in other contexts as well. Reva Siegel has demonstrated that in the context of Victo-
rian ideals of domesticity and nonhierarchical, companionate marriage, nineteenth-century 
courts invoked the discourse of "affective privacy," and employed tropes of domestic "interior-
iry" to preserve in substance, though not in form, the older common law prerogative of hus-
bands to "correct" their wives physically. See Siegel 1996. 
17. On the common law as an important source of self-conscious nineteenth-century 
policymaking, see Novak 1996; Horwitz 1977; Forbath 1991; Hattam 1993. The legal realists 
also contributed valuable insights into the non-neutral social and economic consequences of 
the ostensibly formal, neutral principles of contract. See, for example, Cohen 1935. 
18. On the menace of pauperism in the Gilded Age, see Stanley 1992; Katz, 1986; Boyer 
1978; Trachtenberg 1982. In fact, women's labor inside and outside the home had been cru-
cial to not only household economies but the nation's industrial expansion more generally, 
since the birth of the Republic. It was the increasing "visibility" of this labor, often in the 
form of wage work performed outside the home, that struck postbellum observers as new. See 
Boydston 1990; Stansell 1986; Kessler-Harris 1982. 
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In the face of cyclical and chronic unemployment and intense fears of 
mass pauperism, charity and nuptial reformers as well as policymakers lost 
confidence in the capacity of many poor and working-class families to func-
tion as a shield against dependence on private or public aid. As growing 
numbers of impoverished families entered poorhouses together, professional 
charity organizers increasingly determined that the only way to disrupt the 
transmission of dependence from one generation to the next was to remove 
children from the homes and influence of their pauper parents. 19 It was in 
this context that in the last three decades of the nineteenth century an 
alternative and competing conception of exactly how nuptial unions served 
the public good increasingly posed a legal and political challenge to the 
common law vision of marriage as prima facie beneficial to society. Begin-
ning in the 1870s an aggressive marriage reform campaign, championed 
most publicly by Frank Gaylord Cook, a Boston attorney and reformer, and 
Samuel Dike, the ubiquitous and outspoken corresponding secretary for the 
National Divorce Reform League (later the National League for the Protec-
tion of the Family), waged war on the common law doctrine of private nup-
tial contract (Grossberg 1985, 83-95). 
Charity and nuptial reformers located the problem of mass dependency 
by and large not in the poor pay and chronic unemployment of the indus-
trial wage system, but instead in the moral and biological nature of those 
who were allegedly failing the test of household independence. Though 
many reformers continued to draw distinctions between the "worthy" and 
"unworthy" poor, those dependent on public or private charity were increas-
ingly labeled with the pejorative title of "pauper." "Pauperism" was con-
structed not as an economic problem, but as a moral and behavioral 
epidemic. It was a profoundly personal failing that threatened to infect the 
polity with the repudiation of, even flagrant contempt for, the ideal of male 
and household independence, and for the laws of political economy. As a 
mass phenomenon, moreover, pauperism raised the specter of a potentially 
dangerous urban population, mixing promiscuously, that was economically 
and politically disinvested from, and even hostile to, the goal of social sta-
bility.20 This intellectual and strategic reorientation of urban reform, and 
19. In the words of William Pryor Letchworth, a renowned children's advocate, "rescu-
ing the child" from its alms-receiving parents was the "surest way of correcting the great evil 
of hereditary pauperism now growing rapidly in our state" (cited in Katz 1986, 107). 
20. For a provocative analysis of the construction of "pauperism" in relation to dis-
courses of political economy and the liberal state, and its consequences for strategies of phi-
lanthropy, see Giovanna Procacci 1991. Historians of urban reform have demonstrated that 
between the 1840s and the Gilded Age, reformers fundamentally reconceptualized both the 
nature of the objects of their efforts-the urban population-and the goal of reform work 
itself. In her study of women's benevolent work in the nineteenth century Lori Ginzberg 
depicts the transformation in particularly stark terms. She argues that whereas the prevailing 
antebellum "ideology of benevolence" had aimed at working to redeem society through the 
moral conversion of fallen individuals, the postwar generation of increasingly professional, 
scientifically oriented charity experts "evinced a far more pessimistic and insulated perspec-
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particularly the changing place of the family within many reformers' vision 
of social stability, spurred family advocates to urge a transformed role for the 
state in the regulation of marriage. . 
Opponents of the common law of nuptial privatism such as Cook and 
Dike demanded, and the majority of state legislatures delivered, laws aimed 
at protecting the public interest in the status of marriage. These statutes 
required licensing and registration of all marriages, as well as formal wed-
ding ceremonies performed by sanctioned officers of the state and attended 
by witnesses. Such requirements, their advocates argued, would help put an 
end to the dependency, moral laxity, and legal disorder that informal mar-
riages were alleged to promote. The surge of legislative regulation signaled 
the beginning of a dramatic transformation in what nuptial reformers and 
policymakers believed to be the social consequences of many marriages. It 
marked the decline of the conception of marriage as an intrinsically valua-
ble institution, and the emergence of a more selective vision of exactly 
which marriages would serve the interests of the public. Moreover, by locat-
ing the causes of society's crisis of pauperism in families themselves, rather 
than in the nature of industrial wage relations, reformers and policymakers 
who were invested in the idea of the nation's continued economic growth 
could maintain that the remedy for dependency lay not in state regulation 
of the economy but rather in the moral and behavioral reconstruction of 
one of the most conspicuous and disturbing symbols of social disintegra-
tion-the faltering family. 
In 1888 Frank Cook wrote a series of four highly influential articles 
that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly. He argued that "of all of the institu-
tions of society, marriage is the most fundamental, the most far reaching, 
and most vital. It preceded society; it made society possible; it binds society 
together." Because marriage was "the source and mainstay of society," Cook 
continued, "the state-the legal representative of society- ... [is] most 
deeply concerned in its legal inception" (1888a, 680). At first glance this 
homage to the public importance of marriage appears to characterize the 
social function of the nuptial bond elaborated by text writers such as 
Schouler and Bishop, and by courts in decisions such as De Amarelli's Estate. 
A closer look, however, reveals a telling hint of a shift in emphasis from a 
conception of marriage as forming a discreet, stabilizing unit of society, to an 
understanding of marriage as the literal source of society. The legal program 
around which Cook and other reformers mobilized, and their emphatic as-
sertion of the rights of the social body in opposition to the private rights of 
individuals, mark the beginning of a broad and lasting transformation in the 
tive about human nature and the limits of reform." "Human nature," she writes, "according to 
the once benevolent middle class, had not been amenable to salvation; with the help of the 
state it could perhaps be restrained." Urban reform was thus reoriented away from the inculca-
tion of moral virtue and roward more class-conscious social control (Ginzberg 1990, 200, 
211). See also Fredrickson 1965; Katz 1986. 
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legal and political understanding of exactly how marriages served the public 
good. 
Nuptial reformers railed against what they understood to be the ab-
sence of state regulation of marriage in the United States, bemoaning the 
"rampant individualism" of the common law doctrine. "In the ownership of 
an acre of land," Cook wrote, invoking a popular analogy, "a man is fully 
protected by the law, ... but in the lifelo~g, all-important relation of mar-
riage, property, happiness, honor itself, are often left, by the inefficiency of 
the law, to depend solely upon oral and circumstantial evidence" (1888a, 
668). Even the supposedly quintessentially "private" realm of property trans-
actions, Cook suggested, enjoyed greater legal controls than the free-for-all 
of the American marriage market. The common law of marriage, he be-
lieved, sanctified "the rights of the individual at the expense of the rights of 
society." The body of common law decisions that I have argued represent a 
deliberate judicial policy to reinforce what postbellum courts conceived of 
as the most significant public functions of marriage, Cook understood to be 
blatant negligence toward an institution that was vital to the welfare of 
society. Whereas most nineteenth-century jurists valued the language of 
nuptial privatism as a way to promote marriages in the interest of the public, 
Cook instead saw in common law marriage a "minimum of civil regulation," 
and an expression of "the law of nature as it exists among savage tribes, and 
... in the Middle Ages, the darkest period of modern times" (1888b, 527, 
528, 531). 
The fact that marriage reformers advocated their position in terms of 
an opposition between familiar, time-honored legal categories-that is, be-
tween the rights of the individual and the welfare of the public-should not 
obscure the historical specificity of their underlying concerns. Their cam-
paign to supplant the "laxity, multiplicity, and confusion" in the American 
celebration of marriage with state-directed "strictness, unity, and definite-
ness" (Cook 1888c, '261) represented an anxious reaction to a host of broad 
social transformations that reformers believed posed an imminent threat to 
both "integrity of the family" and the well-being of the nation (1888b, 530). 
The language of the movement suggests that the late-nineteenth-century 
campaign for mandatory nuptial solemnization represents, above all, an ef-
fort to assert a new form of regulatory control over a national population 
that reformers judged to be in ethnic, moral, economic, and gender turmoil. 
Advocates of mandatory nuptial solemnization characterized their pro-
gram of legal reform as a new system of regulations to meet the needs of a 
rapidly changing society. American marriage laws, argued Samuel Dike, "in 
their variety, conflicting terms, and often loose restrictions, are the heritage 
of a union of independent colonies and States, and a lack of a system and 
care in legislation." In light of the "development of the West," however, 
Dike continued, "the growth of our manufactures, [and] the frequent remov-
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als of residence," it was becoming clear that contemporary marriage laws 
"were made for a society that has so greatly changed that they are now felt 
to be a misfit to the social needs of a great nation" (1890,399). That "great 
nation," Dike suggested, could continue to enjoy the progress of economic 
growth without the costs of social dislocation by simply modernizing its 
marriage laws. The nation's celebrated "growth in manufactures" did not 
have to be an enemy of household independence. Rather, the family could 
be made to "work" again by reforming the rules governing its inception. 
Though he welcomed certain aspects of this forward march of modern 
industry, Cook saw in the consequences of industrial development an un-
nerving departure from an ideal and irrecoverable national past. In the early 
years of the republic, he rhapsodized, 
when population was small, scattered, and agricultural, when society 
was simple, frugal, and conservative, respect for law and conformity to 
civil regulations were almost universal. Moreover, as settlers of the 
same faith and race usually dwelt together, there was unanimity of sen-
timent in the protection of the common interest and the maintenance 
of social order. 
In this well-ordered environment of religious and ethnic homogeneity, 
Cook suggested, regulations governing the solemnization of marriage were 
universally observed. Though a noncoercive, largely voluntary system of 
nuptial laws may have adequately served such a stable, localistic society, 
Cook suggested, it was wholly inadequate for the "great, rapidly growing 
nation" of the late-nineteenth century. In the United States of the 1880s, 
he wrote, 
there exists the widest diversity of race, religion, and sentiments. Popu-
lation is congregating in cities. Labor ... is crowding into factories and 
tenements. In the shops, in the factories, in merely every occupation, 
at great odds and under particular temptations, women compete with 
men in the selfish, exacting struggle for preferment, for daily bread. 
Industrial struggle and discontent and social evils are rife in the 
community. 
Though Cook clearly recognized that at least some of the social evils he 
worried about found their origins in the industrial economy, his proposed 
solution was nevertheless. oriented around buttressing the family through 
the legal reform of marriage. Rather than "fortifying our social institutions 
and strengthening the foundations of the social order," he continued, 
American "courts are forsaking, not protecting, are tearing down, not build-
ing up, the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society" (1888b, 530). 
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As this portrait suggests, the apparent moral and economic chaos of 
the industrial laboring class-particularly the ethnic heterogeneity of the 
population and the participation of women in the "industrial struggle"-led 
Cook to reevaluate the wisdom of indiscriminately encouraging marriage 
through nuptial "privatism." With its utter "insecurity," and its threat of 
"clandestine marriages and secret unions," Cook argued, the common law 
doctrine of the private marriage contract introduced into American society 
much of the "license ... of the Middle Ages." In great civilizations of the 
past, he instructed, marriage was a thing of great publicity, and thus subject 
to the better judgment of the bride's parents and of the community. But in 
the modem United States, he declared, a man "may go by stealth at night" 
into the house of a girl's father, "and carry her off without the knowledge or 
consent of her parents." The couple may then, by simple consent, Cook 
worried, "become ... husband and wife ... in law" (1888b, 530, 521, 527). 
In the "simple," "conservative," and most important, homogeneous America 
of the past, Cook believed, nuptial privatism worked because the population 
virtually policed itself. But in the modem industrial metropolis, where a 
certain degree of surveillance and social control was required to maintain 
order, the common law of marriage only encouraged the degradation of an 
already morally precarious population. 
The population toward which nuptial reformers urged the regulatory 
attention of the state, these passages suggest, was understood increasingly in 
terms of its foreignness and ethnicity. The "population congested in ... 
[major American] cities," Cook declared, "is largely, in some mainly, foreign 
born; and the swelling tide of immigration bears to us, unfortunately, ... 
the social evils that fester and threaten in Europe" (1888b, 531). Dike like-
wise urged that greater public attention be given to the foreign "source" of 
"our dangers." A "thorough study" by experts of the "foreign element in our 
own country would," he wrote, 
show the need for more official and private watchfulness of the domes-
tic morals of this class, and that a careful supervision of our immigrants 
would affect our domestic morals most favorably. The uncertain mari-
tal relations of some immigrants from countries where illicit unions 
take the place of lawful marriage, ... and where illegitimate births are 
... [frequent, and where] unchastity must exist among a very large 
proportion, ... makes ... legislation very desirable. (National Divorce 
Reform League 1887, 6) 
Reformers such as Cook and Dike understood the menace to American soci-
ety that solemnization laws were intended to combat to be largely an exter-
nal one. At least in this dimension of the "marriage problem," they 
suggested, it was less the degradation of the traditional "American" marriage 
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relation than the massive injection of foreigners into the national popula-
tion that demanded aggressive legislative regulation. 
As reformers turned their focus more to the condition of the American 
population, social problems were increasingly enunciated as political 
problems of national scope. The influx of Europe's human refuse into Amer-
ican cities, Cook warned, represented an "imminent danger to the state 
through ... political corruption." He likewise attributed "the recent anarch-
ist disturbances" to the domination of American cities by immigrants 
(1888b, 531). Others emphasized the economic costs of a deteriorating na-
tional population. Foreshadowing the rise of eugenics in the coming decade, 
Dike reported in 1888 that the "most potent single cause[sl of crime" were 
"Bad Homes and Heredity" (National Divorce Reform League 1889, 12). 
The national regulation of marriage, of course, spoke directly to both these 
problems. By defining the source of society's problems as largely an 
ethnocultural and biological siege on the American population, these critics 
of common law marriage signaled the early stages of a transformation from 
an understanding of marriage as the creation of viable households-the fun-
damental units of society-to a conception of marriage as the source of pop-
ulation. Most important, perhaps, ethnicity became for many reformers a 
language with which to talk about-or rather, to avoid talking about-la-
bor militancy, class conflict, and structural poverty. By characterizing the 
social disorder and pauperism in American cities as a problem of an under-
regulated immigrant population, reformers mobilized an effective trope with 
which to lay blame on the poor themselves. Thus they could avoid con-
fronting the inherent contradiction between the social consequences of an 
industrial capitalism and the ideal of self-sufficient, single-male-breadwin-
ner households. 
Because nuptial reformers constructed the crisis of the family as a con-
sequence of the under-policed morals of an ethnically marked class of for-
eign origin rather than of the untouchable realm of labor relations, they 
were, prepared to advocate a transformed and more explicit regulatory role 
for the state. For marriage activists this role took the form of widely adopted 
mandatory nuptial solemnization laws. Reformers and lawmakers recognized 
in the common law doctrine of private nuptial contract only a socially inju-
rious dearth of concern for the public good. In retrospect it appears that the 
public policy functions of judicially constructed nuptial privatism were, in 
the minds of many late-nineteenth-century Americans, insufficient to the 
task of governing the modem population. At the time, however, reformers 
and policymakers articulated the new regulations as a policy of upholding 
the interest of society over the rights of individuals. One advocate of solem-
nization requirements explained in justification of the recent nuptiallegisla-
tion that marriage was "of greater moment to the state than to the parties 
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themselves. [Marriage is] the parent, not the child of society, ... [which 
may] be molded by ,the State" (Weightman 1883, 184). 
The judicial reception of the late-nineteenth-century solemnization 
laws starkly illustrates two competing conceptions of the social function of 
marriage. The legal debate took shape around the question of whether to 
construe the new statutes as mandatory-and thus to render void ab initio 
all unions that failed to conform-or as merely directory, in which case the 
common law rule would continue to prevail over the legislative reforms. 
Though most courts continued to favor the common law doctrine of simple 
consent, a substantial minority endorsed the new regulations, and in doing 
so articulated their belief in the need to protect the interests of society and 
state in terms characteristic of the nuptial reformers. Moreover, the judicial 
language in the decisions reveals a more fundamental contest between com-
peting visions of exactly how, and by whom, the marriage relation would be 
mobilized in law as a strategy of public governance. 
A majority of late-nineteenth-century jurists called on to determine 
the validity of marriages formed in violation of state solemnization require-
ments agreed with Thomas Cooley's declaration that marriage was a "com-
mon right" that could be entered into by simple "present agreement," even 
"if all ceremony be dispensed with," and regardless of the "restrictive regula-
tions" of "local statutes" (Hutchins v. Kimmell 1875, 127). In 1877 the U.S. 
Supreme Court explicitly endorsed Cooley's construction of the statutory 
regulations. "Such formal provisions may be construed as merely directory," 
Justice Strong argued, "instead of being treated as destructive of a common-
law right to form the marriage relation by words of present assent." Behind 
this invocation of the common law of contract lay the same public policy 
considerations pursued by courts through the language of nuptial privatism. 
Justice Strong explained that "the statutes are held merely directory" not 
simply because marriage is considered "a thing of common right, [bur] be-
cause it is the policy of the state to encourage it, and because ... any other 
construction would compel holding illegitimate the offspring of many par-
ents conscious of no violation of the law" (Meister v. Moore 1877, 79,81).21 
21. See also State v. Walker 1887; Peck v. Peck 1880; Cartwright v. McGown 1887; State 
v. Bittick 1890; Campbell's Admin. and Heirs v. Gullatt 1869; Port v. Port (1873). When it 
refused to void the second marriage of a divorced man who had been legally forbidden from 
remarrying, a Mississippi court similarly elevated the "happiness and security of society" above 
the "prerequisite formalities of a statute." The man who illegally contracted a second mar-
riage, the court emphatically declared, may be criminally punished, but with him the punish-
ment must stop. "To extend the punishment to the second wife, ... innocent of any thought 
even of violating any law, and extend the punishment further to the helpless and unsinning 
offspring of the second union, would ... not only be cruel and unjust, but would be, more-
over, a departure from the humane spirit of the law, which regards every marriage with favor 
and seeks to uphold the validity of every marriage contract. ... The innocent second wife, 
and unoffending offspring are not to be branded, one as having lived in concubinage and the 
others as having been born bastards" (Crawford v.- State 1895, 178-79). A frequently cited 
English case makes the power of judicial construction regarding feminine virtue even more 
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The court's decision was firmly rooted in the prevailing postbellum judicial 
practice of securing female sexual virtue and filial legitimacy through the 
expansive, enabling rule of present consent; a practice based on an "older" 
and, by the late nineteenth century, waning conception of the marriage 
relation as an intrinsically beneficial end of public policy. 
A substantial minority of late-nineteenth-century courts, however, re-
jected the Supreme Court's interpretation, and instead constructed the sol-
emnization statutes as mandatory. In doing so they voided the marriages of 
couples who failed to comply with the new laws, and articulated an em-
phatic repudiation of nuptial "privatism" and of the dominant postbellum 
public policy conception of the marriage relation as prima facie beneficial to 
society. "While the married state is a most commendable one," declared a 
Washington State court, "and ought to be encouraged in all legitimate 
ways," dispensing with the statutory requirements would "set a premium on 
illicit intercourse." When "cohabitation and reputation without any agree-
ment constitute marriage," Judge Scott reasoned, fornication must necessar-
ily precede matrimony (In re Mclaughlin's Estate 1892, 588, 590, 589).22 
The common law of nuptial contract, traditionally wielded by courts as a 
shield against promiscuity, is here instead charged with encouraging sexual 
immorality. This interpretation reflects the emergent understanding of the 
legal inception of marriage as a strategy with which to govern an increas-
ingly morally suspect urban population. 
The court argued that rejecting the validity of marriages formed 
through informal contracts and forcing couples to adhere to publicly pre-
scribed procedures of marriage would impress on them the solemnity of their 
action as well as its importance to the public. By so doing it would also 
prevent the great social menace of divorce. The common law of marriage 
promoted divorce, the judge argued, because "a contract this lightly made 
might as easily" be dissolved. "It is contrary to public policy and public 
morals," the court continued, "and revolting to the senses of enlightened 
society that parties could place themselves in such a condition that they 
might mutually repudiate." By rendering void ab initio the unions of people 
who failed to comply with the solemnization requirements, the court sought 
to reconstruct the very way in which the American public conceived of the 
explicitly: To construe solemnization requirements as mandatory, ruled the court, would be to 
determine that a "woman, however innocent and virtuous, who, failing only to comply with 
mere forms of the statute, celebrates a marriage sanctioned by natural and divine law ... is a 
mistress." To void such a marriage, the court declared, would be to "tum adrift the wretched 
female who has been deluded into the snares of a villain, or has ignorantly supposed that she 
was ascending the hymeneal bed which the construction of the law harshly converts into the 
couch of the prostitute." See Catterall v. Sweetman 1845 (cited in J. 1888, li). 
22. Nuptial privatism, he warned, also threatened female sexual purity by undermining 
the ability of parents to conttol their daughters. If "common law marriages are to be recog-
nized ... as by a simple agreement," the court wtote, "a man, though forty years a senior, and 
a girl of the age of twelve years, can enter into this relationship regardless of the will of the 
parents" (In re McLaughlin's Estate 1892, 589). 
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marriage relation. "By adhering to the statutory provisions," Judge Scott in-
structed, "parties are led to regard the contract as a sacred one, as one not 
lightly entered into, and are forcibly impressed with the idea that they are 
forming a relationship in which society has an interest, and to which the 
state is a party" (In re McLaughlin's Estate 1892, 590).23 By performing a 
publicly prescribed ritual of matrimony, the court suggested, people partici-
pated in and became subject to an act of state governance. Through the 
regulation of marriage, the population would "feel" the power of the state 
and thus come to understand the great public consequence of their actions. 
The characterization of the personal lives of individuals as integrally related 
and vital to the operation and well-being of the state was an important step 
in the larger legal, political, and theoretical transformation of the popula-
tion into a national citizenry. 
Above all, the judicial language in In re McLaughlin's Estate signals the 
beginning of a fundamental shift from the family to the population as the 
primary end of governance. "There is a growing belief, the court observed, 
"that the welfare of society demands ... that an institution like marriage," 
which is so closely and thoroughly related to the state should be the 
most carefully guarded, and that improvident and improper marriages 
should be prevented. All wise and healthful regulations in this direction 
prohibiting such marriages as far as practicable would tend to the pre-
vention of pauperism and crime, and the transmission of hereditary 
diseases and defects, and it may not by regarded as too chimerical to 
say that in the future laws may be passed looking to this end. (In re 
McLaughlin's Estate 1892,590,591)24 
The court located the source of society's most burdensome ills-economic 
dependency, crime, and disease-in the unhealthful biological condition of 
the population, a consequence of improvident unions. It is clear from the 
court's emphasis on the prevention of socially harmful traits, moreover, that 
for at least some jurists nuptial regulation represented the possibility of not 
only prescribing the form that the celebration of marriage would take, but 
also of completely proscribing some unions. The public policy of marriage, 
the court reasoned, should serve the production of a "healthy" citizenry. 
The decision suggested that marriage should not be blindly promoted, as the 
advocates of the common law doctrine seemed to believe, but conscien-
tiously "guarded." For nuptial reformers and jurists like Judge Scott, the cre-
ation of new marriages was no longer an intrinsically desirable end of public 
23. Emphasis added. 
24. See also Beverlin v. Beverlin 1887,737, another minority decision, in which the court 
found that although West Virginia's solemnization requirements did not expressly nullify un-
ions that were formed in violation of the law, "our statute has wholly superseded the common 
law and in effect, if not in express terms, renders invalid all attempted marriages contracted in 
this State which have not been solemnized in substantial compliance with its provisions." 
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policy; rather, the selective prohibition of certain unions was emerging as an 
instrument that legislatures and courts wielded in· their governance of the 
population. The court's prediction regarding future legislation, moreover, 
was exactly right. For in the two decades following the decision in In re 
McLaughlin's Estate, the nation would see a dramatic proliferation of state 
laws prohibiting the marriages of many citizens on the basis of biological 
and hereditary fitness. 
THE RISE OF EUGENIC MARRIAGE: THE 
HEREDITARILY FIT CITIZENRY IN THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 
By the turn of the century, the legal contest had swung decidedly in 
favor of the reformers, social scientists, and legislators who regarded only a 
select class of unions to be socially advantageous. As marriage came to be 
conceived of less as an inherently valuable social institution, it became un-
derstood increasingly in terms of its procreative function. This transforma-
tion was heavily informed by the rise of hereditarian conceptions of 
individual behavior and capacity. As social reformers, journalists, social 
scientists, and policymakers began to imagine a population of biologically 
endowed individuals, social fitness became dependent on collective individ-
ual fitness. The "cell is for the body what the individual is for society," 
wrote one eugenicist in The Arena in 1890, "and the body politic dies a 
natural death through the inability of the individual member to sustain 
himself .... [T]he new generations fail in the work of progress because the 
renewal of individuals is left to the unfit, and the civilization dies" (Stanley 
1890,95). The marriage relation, in turn, was increasingly characterized as 
the biological source of the citizenry. This brand of hereditary determinism 
underwrote a strategy of nuptial governance that focused less on environ-
mental reform and material provision, and more on regulating the reproduc-
tion of the population. As the wellspring of social heredity, marriage was 
increasingly constructed and mobilized not as the principle end of public 
policy, but as a selective instrument through which the American state gov-
erned the population. By the Progressive era, in short, marriage served the 
"public good" as a strategy of governance in the reproduction of hereditarily 
fit citizens. 
This vision of marriage rested on the idea that the urban population 
was made up of hereditarily endowed atoms that were becoming increas-
ingly individuated relative to their respective family units. Samuel Dike 
wrote in 1890 that in the United States, where "individualism and its legal 
and social ideas are more fully developed" than anywhere else, "the Family 
has given place to the Individual" (1890, 403). Many contemporary observ-
ers agreed that the modern family had been radically destabilized and super-
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seded by the individual as the most fundamental unit of American society. 
This rapid trend toward individualism was inextricabl~ from the decline of 
the "patriarchal regime" (Calhoun 1919, 174). The family, observed Co-
lumbia University professor of education Willystine Goodsell, had ceased to 
function as an economic, legal, and religious unity under the state-backed 
authority of the husband and father. R:ather, he wrote, "the modern house-
hold not infrequently presents the phenomenon of a group of clashing wills, 
an association of highly individualized persons, each asserting his rights." 
Though this development brought significant gains to humanity by under-
mining the familial "autocrat," Goodsell continued, "it would seem that in 
some instances [the family of the twentieth century] has paid for the inde-
pendence of its members the costly price of its very existence" (1915, 56, 
57). What represented the economic and moral bedrock of the state in the 
postbellum era had become, for some, more a voluntary association of self-
interested individuals.z5 
Other critics, however, saw in the alleged dissolution of the family an 
exciting new opportunity for the construction of a more national citizenry 
and for the strengthening of the state by expanding its role in the govern-
ance of that citizenry. Despite the current "disorganizing tendencies toward 
free individualism," one optimistic writer noted, "the reduction of family 
functions has not been solely anarchistic but has been due in large measure 
to the transfer of prerogatives to more inclusive social institutions"-most 
notably schools, child protection societies, orphan asylums, churches, and 
the growing body of child labor laws (Calhoun 1919, 173). Sociologist 
George Elliott Howard remarked of this transfer of authority that "little by 
25. Social scientists and other critics sometimes represented this condition as an inevita-
ble result of a historical trend in the West toward the democratization of society and the 
expansion of individual rights, initiated in the Renaissance, elaborated during the Enlighten-
ment, and embedded in the founding principles of the American state. Others blamed a relax-
ation of moral standards, or the growing presence of women in the labor force, college, and 
the professions. A few explicitly attributed the crisis of the family to the ravaging effects of 
the urban industrial economy (Goodsell 1915, 328-41; Calhoun 1919, 156; The Present Dis-
integration of the American Home 1911,296-98). One of the most influential scholars of the 
family in the Progressive Era, the UniverSity of Chicago sociologist George Elliott Howard, 
wrote that the historical development 
most threatening to the solidarity of the family is believed to be the individualistic ten-
dencies arising in existing urban and economic life. With the rise of corporate and asso-
ciated industry comes a weakening of the intimacy of home ties. Through the division of 
labor the 'family hearth-stone' is fast becoming a mere temporary meeting-place of indi-
vidual wage-earners .... The tenement and the 'sweating system' are destructive of the 
home. Neither the lodging-house, the 'flat,' nor the 'apartment' affords an ideal environ-
ment for domestic joys .... To the children of the slum the street is a perilous nursery. 
For them squalor, disease, and sordid vice have supplanted the traditional blessings of the 
family sanctuary. The cramped, artificial, and transient associations of the boarding 
house are a wretched substitute for the privacy of the separate household (1904, 227-28). 
Under such conditions, the postbellum legal ideal of the physically private, geographically 
stable, and economically self-sufficient family that functioned as SOCiety's most foundational 
public and private institution appeared increasingly unrealistic. 
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little ... the original 'coercive' powers of the family under the patriarchal 
regime have been 'extracted' and appropriated by society" (1904, 226). For 
Howard this process held great promise .. When "the tie ~hat binds [the fam-
ily's] members together ceas[es] to be juridical," he wrote in McClure's Mag-
azine, it becomes more "spirituaL" When the despotic, coercive element of 
the family is stripped away by more far-reaching social institutions, and 
when "the corporate unity of the patriarchal family has been broken up or 
even completely destroyed," there emerges "a loftier ideal of the marital 
union and a juster view of the relative shares of the sexes in the world's 
work." By dismantling the traditional· patriarchal family unit, moreover, it 
was possible for a truly national citizenry and an empowered regulatory state 
to take shape. It is "at the expense of the old solidarity of the family," How-
ard enthusiastically declared, that "the new solidarity of the state is being 
won" (1909, 238). 
For many influential advocates of eugenics, the health of that national 
citizenry rested squarely on its aggregate hereditary endowment. 26 Karl Pear-
son, one of the leading British popularizers of eugenics, wrote in Popular 
Science Monthly that "permanence and dominance in the world passes to 
and from nations even with their rise and fall in mental and bodily fitness" 
(1907, 389). "Disease and health," Pearson wrote, "vigor and impotence, 
intelligence and stupidity, sanity and insanity ... -all the things which 
make for strength or weakness of character-must be ... dissected under 
the statistical microscope, if we are to realize why nations rise and fall, if we 
are to know whether our own folk is progressing or regressing." The nation's 
folk, all agreed, were in dangerous decline. "The growth of human sympa-
thy-" he continued, "and is not this one of the chief factors in national 
fitness?-has been so rapid during the century that it has cried Halt! to 
almost every form of racial purification." Only the scientific application of 
26. A broad cross-section of scientists, reformers, academics, and the literate public em-
braced the discourse of eugenics in the 1900s and 1910s. Broadly conceived, the term eugenics 
refers to the "science" of improving the biological condition of the human race through selec-
tive breeding. First elaborated in England in the late nineteenth century, eugenics was popu-
larized in the United States in the 1890s and 1900s. Eugenicists warned that the modern 
tendency toward social reform, charity, and sympathy for society's unfortunate-society's will-
ingness "to keep the helpless and diseased alive" -had arrested the process of natural selec-
tion, and thus inhibited the progress of the "race." "Environmental" reform, they argued, 
contributed to the deterioration of the "national stock" because it failed to alter the "germ 
plasm" of the population. In other words, nature always prevailed over nurture. The "less fit 
members of the race in a civilized and artificial society," wrote one sociologist, "are enabled to 
survive in the struggle and to pass on their defects to coming generations" (Batten 1908, 236, 
237). Virtually every undesirable personal and social trait was believed to be hereditary, in-
cluding criminality, pauperism, sexual immorality, insanity, and, perhaps most menacing of 
all, "feeblemindedness"-a general condition of substandard intelligence to which most of the 
preceding afflictions were frequently attributed. The heredity of the population, sometimes to 
the virtual exclusion of all other factors, dictated the ascent or decline of society (Kevles 
1985,3-56,70':"84; Degler 1991; Haller 1963). 
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the principles of eugenics, and a "higher patriotism and pride of race" could 
check national "deterioration" (Pearson 1907, 392, 398, 399). 
If the national stock was to be redeemed, moreover, the state had to 
engage itself more aggressively in what one writer described as the "business 
of citizen-making" (Humphrey 1913,457). Eugenicists worried that natural 
selection, the great "purifier of the state" was no longer in operation (Pear-
son 1907, 412). For this reason, one sociologist wrote, "the state ... must 
[assume] a more intelligent interest in the whole program of race making" 
(Batten 1908, 259). If the American nation is to elevate the "innate capac-
ity of its citizenry," suggested Charles Davenport, the most prominent 
American advocate of eugenics, society must free itself from the "fundamen-
tal falsehood that 'all men are created equal'" (1912, 281, 282). In a na-
tional population understood in terms of its hereditary fitness, eugenicists 
suggested, equal citizenship should be awarded selectively, according to the 
dictates of science. 
It was widely believed not by only "professional" eugenicists but also by 
politicians, social scientists, journalists, and reformers that the quality of the 
American citizenry was rapidly deteriorating. Three causes-the declining 
birth rate of the "better classes," the relative fertility of the "unfit," and the 
unnatural selection of society's incapables due to the "short-sighted kind-
heartedness" of philanthropists-were equally to blame (Heredity and 
Human Progress 1900, 350). One writer declared that "if present conditions 
are allowed to continue, it can be shown with mathematical certainty that 
the families of the present upper classes, with their share of the good quali-
ties of our race, will simply cease to exist" (Extinction of the Upper Classes 
1909,97). In one of his many published articles advocating eugenics, Presi-
dent Roosevelt made the ethnocultural undercurrent of positive citizen re-
production quite clear. The "average native American family of native 
American descent has so few children," he worried, "that the birth rate has 
fallen below the death rate" (1907). "It is lamentable," he wrote on another 
occasion, "to see this Puritan conscience, this New England conscience, so 
atrophied, so diseased and warped, as not to recognize that the fundamental, 
the unpardonable crime against the race is the crime of race suicide" (1914, 
32).27 
As the regulation of social reproduction became an increasingly impor-
tant element of the reform agenda, so did the importance of the procreative 
dimension of marriage. The responsibilities of "patriotic parenthood" were 
highly distinguished by gender. In an ideological environment where "fit" 
27. In spite of the highly suggestive ethnic and class bias of Roosevelt's warnings, more 
"principled" eugenicists accused the president of encouraging "reckless fertility," and for hold-
ing "the rabbit theory of national wellbeing." (EugeniCS 1904, 446). A lawyer writing a few 
years later gave the "race" in "race suicide" a more explicit definition. "In the United States," 
he wrote, "the foreign element is so prolific and the native birth rate so much on the decline 
that the Anglo-Saxon race is threatened with extinction" (Manson 1914, 126). 
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procreation was constructed as an act of national service, men could serve 
their nation by marrying young and supporting large families, while women 
bore the duty of mothering the race. Women's procreative and hereditary 
contributions to the citizenry were variably considered the most patriotic or 
the most criminal of acts. "Motherhood" was not simply the private act of 
individual women, editorialized the Survey, but "a factor in the production 
of dominant races" (Parenthood and Race Culture 1910, 732).28 For many 
Progressive Era eugenicists, women served as the hereditary gatekeepers of 
the citizenry. According to Michael Guyer, a University of Wisconsin zool-
ogist and author of Being Well Born, "woman is the decisive factor in race-
betterment, for it is she who says the final yea or nay which decides mar-
riage, and thus determines in large measure the qualities which will be pos-
sessed by her children." When women realized that they were the "trustees" 
of "the immortal germ plasm," he continued, they would "see the necessity 
of demanding a clean bill of health on the part of their prospective mates" 
(1916).29 As professional eugenicists, politicians, social scientists, family re-
formers, and journalists came to view the hereditary quality of the Ameri-
can population as a crucial determinant of the country's future, and thus as 
the primary object of state governance, patriotic motherhood was presented 
as an obligation for women who wished to remain dutiful to their nation.30 
28. On the construction of motherhood in Progressive Era discourses of "racial" and 
national uplift, and in "maternalist" social policy, see Bederman 1995; Mink 1990, 1995. For a 
different interpretation of maternalist social policy, see Skocpol 1992. 
29. Quoted in Kevles 1985,67. Two other enthusiasts of eugenics described the duty of 
conscientious motherhood in much less participatory terms. If the nation's "stock of human 
life ... be divided into capital and income," the authors wrote, "while men represent the 
income, ... women to a large extent must be considered as capital, ... to be husbanded 
carefully for the future, thus to give credit and stability to the whole fabric of national life" 
(Wetham and Wetham 1909, 106). 
30. Activists for a healthy citizenry frequently blamed the expansion of women's sphere 
and rights for the declining birth rate of the nation's "better stock." Champions of patriotic 
motherhood charged that women's "new freedom" had been "twisted into wrong where it has 
been taken to mean a relief from all those duties and obligations which ... women cannot 
expect to escape" (Mr. Roosevelt's Views on Race Suicide 1906, 21). "Surely it is more than a 
coincidence that the period of growth of the so-called feminist movement," wrote two advo-
cates of "husbanding" female reproductive capital, "is also the period of decline in the fulfill-
ment of the essentially womanly duties," which was evidenced by "the fall of the birth rate." If 
the "higher civilization[sl ... persist in withdrawing women from the homes and throwing 
them into the competitive struggle for existence, or the political organization of the country, 
that form of civilization carries with it the seeds of its own destruction" (Wetham and 
Wetham 1909, 106). 
Roosevelt similarly editorialized that the "only new woman in whom I believe ... is she 
who adds new qualities to, and does not try to substitute them for, the primal, the fundamen-
tal, virtues of the 'old' woman-she who was the wife, the mother ... of the past." For both 
sexes, Roosevelt continued, no "career is more than a poor substitute for the career of married 
lovers who bring into the world ... children sufficiently numerous so that the race shall go 
forward and not back." For a man, he declared, the "best career ... is to be the breadwinner 
for his wife and children," while for a woman, no "career is so useful and honorable, nor needs 
such self-sacrifice and wisdom, as the career of a good and wise mother." If women were to 
avoid perpetuating the national trend toward "race suicide"-the "unpardonable crime 
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The national threat posed by the "pathos of having good old families 
represented in the next generation by smaller numbers" (Mr. Roosevelt's 
Views on Race Suicide 1906, 21) was surpassed only by the "fecundity" of 
the unfit (Humphrey 1913, 458). While the nation's "best blood fails to 
perpetuate itself," editorialized the Independent, "the poor and worthless 
marry and have many children" (Parenthood 1908,645). The least fit "one 
seventh of the present generation," it declared, "will be the parents of one 
half of the next" (Evolution Working Backward 1906, 703). In America, 
wrote an author in the Arena, we "behold the melancholy spectacle of the 
renewal of the great mass of society" by the "floating population [which] is 
always the scum." The unfit stock of feebleminded casual laborers, more-
over, was often explicitly identified as of foreign origin. We "cannot expect 
a rude and vigorous people to resuscitate us," argued one critic, "and it is 
quite unlikely that we shall receive immigrants from another sphere. We 
must work out our own salvation by scientific methods" (Stanley 1890,95). 
Harvard Professor J. B. Peabody similarly lamented that "instead of decreas-
ing our own unfit classes" of "insane, feeble-minded, the idiot, the criminal, 
and the pauper," we "go on adding to them by admitting every year 
thousands of unfit immigrants" (1912). There was, most agreed, a breeding 
war underway between the classes.31 
The reverse evolution caused by the survival of the unfittest was often 
attributed to the sympathy and charity that American society lavished on 
its degenerates. "We see pain and suffering only to relieve it," chided Pear-
son, "without inquiring as to the moral character of the sufferer or as to his 
national or racial value." He went on to articulate an even more sensational 
image of infestation and pollution of the social body by artificially main-
tained degenerates. The label of "race suicide," he wrote in Popular Science, 
resonates with "anyone who has seen, even from afar, the nine circles of 
that dread region which stretches from slum to reformatory, from casual 
ward and stew to prison, from hospital and sanitarium to asylum and special 
school; that infemallake which sends its unregarded rivulets to befoul more 
fertile social tracts" (1907, 406, 407-8). Because of the humanitarian effect 
of its expanding functions, alarmed eugenicists argued, the state was poison-
ing the biological constitution of its own future population. 
against the race"-they would have to forgo extrafamilial interests and commit themselves to 
the reproduction of the citizenry (Roosevelt 1914,32,33). 
31. One writer cautioned the readers of the Forum not to underestimate the menace of 
the degenerate: "The woman with a worthless husband who comes in on 'scrubbing-day' may 
enlist our sympathy because of her six children, but our minds stop short of projecting upon 
future generations those six children of a degenerate man, as against our own two, or one, or 
none. Yet his children, and theirs again, doubtless well be as prolific as he, and ours as un-
prolific as we. And so it is with degenerates generally,-we pity, we aid, but we mentally 
detach them as of no account in the social structure, whereas they are among the chief build-
ers of it" (Humphrey 1913). 
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Just as the nation's "good old families" were charged with the racial 
responsibility to step up their birth rate, the hereditarily unfit bore the pa-
triotic duty of not procreating. The anthropologist and social critic Elsie 
Clews Parsons wrote in 1906 that as scientific knowledge demonstrated "the 
disastrous results of the mating of those handicapped by ... taints or lacks, 
the social obligation in marriage will be held more and more considerable." 
As society demanded a population endowed with "progressive traits, physi-
cal, moral, and mental, as well as a lack of disease on the part of child 
bearers and begetters," greater pressure would be placed "upon the individ-
ual." As people became increasingly aware of the "costs to the state by re-
production by its diseased and vicious subjects," she declared, "individuals 
tainted by epilepsy, insanity, inebriacy, deaf-mutism, venereal disease, etc." 
would be considered "morally guilty if they marry" (1906, 344).J2 When the 
moral and economic burdens of the state were located in the hereditary 
condition of its population, Parsons suggested, individuals were conceived of 
as bearers and begetters of the future citizenry, while the marriage relation 
was constructed as a regulatory valve through which flowed the biological 
endowment of the nation. 
Though in the postbellum era marriage was generally understood to be 
a bulwark against economic dependence, in the Progressive era it was in-
creasingly feared to be a potential source of pauperism. A passage that How-
ard appropriated from a British text pointedly demonstrates the way in 
which conceptions of the marriage relation's public function were shifting 
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Though to the "super-
ficial observer," declared the text's author, "it may appear that every mar-
riage must enrich the state," that idea proved utterly false. "To be a source 
of wealth to the state," he wrote, a family "must at least be self-supporting, 
which is exactly what the feeble, degenerate children of the great mass of 
our early marriages are not." "Instead of being a source of wealth to the 
state," the "ill-developed and unhealthy" offspring of "improvident parents 
... prove a serious drain on her resources." Such children "drag out a pitiful 
existence only to become inmates in our workhouses and infirmaries, our 
asylums and prisons." They are "supported at the public expense ... [and 
few] ever become robust, useful, self-supporting citizens" (Strahan 1892, 
245).33 Economic independence was no longer a presumed consequence of 
the marriage relation. Though just a generation earlier, matrimony had 
been almost invariably encouraged as matter of good public economic pol-
icy, by the turn of the century marriage was increasingly understood to be 
potentially detrimental to the state. 
32. Roosevelt expressed similar sentiments when, in the pages of the Outlook, he 
"wish[edl very much that the wrong people could be prevented from breeding .... Criminals 
should be sterilized, and feeble-minded persons forbidden to leave offspring behind" (1914, 
32). 
33. Cited in Howard 1904, 243-44. 
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In a nation where economic independence had long been idealized as a 
prerequisite of full citizenship, and in an intellectual, legal, and political 
environment that understood capacity in terms of heredity, those depen-
dent on public support represented the antithesis of fit citizens. As one au-
thor explained in the North American Review, there is "no pauper who may 
not wed a pauper and beget more paupers to the end of his story" (Phelps 
1890, 130).34 Though some early eugenicists believed that there was a "pau-
per germ" passed from generation to generation, after the turn of the cen-
tury, economic dependence was more frequently characterized, along with 
other socially expensive deficiencies such as sexual immorality and crimi-
nality, as an attribute of hereditary mental weakness. The "menace of the 
feebleminded" emerged as a national crisis with the rapidly growing popu-
larity of the Binet-Simon Intelligence (IQ) test in the 1910s (Kevles 1985, 
83-84). "It is universally conceded," declared one observer in the Forum, 
"that a high proportion of habitual criminals, paupers, prostitutes, vagrants, 
and incapables generally are mentally defective; that feeble-mindedness is 
the keystone of the whole miserable arch; that of all characteristics it is the 
most certain in its heredity, yielding a self-perpetuating, self-increasing army 
of miserables" (Humphrey 1913, 461). 
In a dramatic regulatory convergence around the procreation of the 
citizenry, nuptial-reform advocates across a wide range of disciplines insisted 
that the marriage relation be mobilized by the state as an instrument of 
governance. The biological health of the polity, they argued, demanded a 
more aggressive extension of police power into the matrimonial sphere. Be-
cause "the safety of the social body requires that a check be put on the 
propagation of the unfit," Howard declared in 1904, "the state has a func-
tion to perform." In the future, he urged, "the marriage of persons mentally 
delinquent or tainted by hereditary disease or crime ... [should] be legally 
restrained" (1904, 258). The conceptual sanctuary of private rights, sug-
gested one physician, had to be exploded in the service of the public inter-
est. "The worst enemy to man," he wrote in the Survey, is "the childish fear 
of interference which under the glamour of freedom keeps us all the more 
strongly in bondage" (Meyer 1916, 244). 
Most legal observers likewise considered the eugenic health of the pub-
lic a worthy justification for state regulation. Though "marriage ... is a 
matter of ... common right," argued one writer in the Yale Law Journal, "it 
is so firmly bound up with the very life of the state ... as to be distinctively 
and preeminently within the police power." As long as nuptial regulations 
"can find reasonable justification as public health measures in the interests 
of those now living or of posterity ... they will doubtless be upheld as a 
constitutional exercise of this power" (Spencer 1915, 64). Another advo-
cate of injecting medical science into the law of marriage declared in the 
34. Cited in Howard 1904, 254. 
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Harvard Law Review that "it is the noble mission ... of the legislator to stay 
the evil" of biologically unsound marriages "at its source, and to say that, 
insofar as law can effect it, future generations will be of sound mind and 
body, imbued with all the qualities which make for national greatness" 
(Swindlehurst 1916, 140). 
These statements suggest not simply an extension of legislative regula-
tion into what had been conceived of as a predominantly "private" dimen-
sion of marriage-that is, procreation-but a more fundamental 
transformation in the relation of the state to its citizens. The Outlook re-
ported that the "old idea that the state was a sort of policeman to protect 
the individual against the encroachments of his fellow-men has been super-
seded by a larger conception-that of the State as the organization of the 
whole community for the purpose of doing for itself whatever it can do 
better than any individual or group of individuals can do for it" (Eugenic 
Marriage Laws 1913,342). 
At first this passage suggests an example of traditional police power 
rhetoric-an announcement of the authority of the state to protect the in-
terests of society over the rights and freedoms of individuals. When it is 
considered in the context of eugenic conceptions of the citizenry, as well as 
what I have argued was a shift in the primary object of governance from the 
family to the population, however, we see that by policing the heredity of its 
citizens, the state was also ensuring its own future fitness. When national 
health was imagined in terms of the biological fitness of the citizenry, indi-
vidual citizens became not merely constituents of the state but constitutive of 
the state. When "nationhood" was reformulated as national heredity, the 
eugenic marriage law represented, in effect, a strategy of national self-con-
stitution. "There is a growing realization," wrote Parsons, "that the state 
must develop through the individual, but that the individual must develop 
through the state" (1906,355). Through the hereditary and regulatory me-
dium of marriage, the state and the citizen would literally become mutually 
constitutive. 
Though the calls of scientists, reformers, academics, and journalists for 
eugenically inspired marriage laws preceded the legislative enactments by a 
few years, it would not necessarily be accurate to say that the multifaceted 
public discourse of national hereditary fitness literally caused the laws. The 
"legal," "cultural," and "scientific" dimensions of eugenic marriage reform 
cannot, at least on the level of public advocacy, be reified into conceptually 
distinct spheres. Legislatures, courts, professional eugenicists, reformers, pol-
iticians, and other rhetoricians operated in continuous dialogue with one 
another, frequently referring or responding to writers outside their immedi-
ate "disciplines." The legislation and its judicial reception are best con-
ceived of as the institutional manifestation of a broad and multifarious array 
of ideas. That is not to say, however, that all sources of eugenic discourse 
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were equivalent. The law, backed by the authority of the state and fre-
quently enforced through a direct exercise of the police power, brought to 
bear a particularly powerful normative and coercive pressure on those it 
"touched." 
Citizens most frequently touched by the eugenic marriage laws were, of 
course, those deemed tainted with a hereditary mental or constitutional de-
ficiency. In 1909 the Washington state legislature enacted one of the more 
comprehensive, though by no means exceptional, sets of nuptial 
prohibitions: 
No woman under the age of forty-five years, or man of any age, except 
he marry a woman over the age of forty-five years, either of whom is a 
common drunkard, habitual criminal, epileptic, imbecile, feeble-
minded person, idiot or insane person, or person who has theretofore 
been afflicted with hereditary insanity, or who is afflicted with pulmo-
nary tuberculosis in its advanced stages, or any contagious venereal dis-
ease, shall hereafter intermarry or marry any other person within this 
state. (Wash. Compo Stat. Ann. §8439 [Remington 1916]) 
Virtually every imaginable social and medical problem, the law suggested, 
could and should be checked at its source by preventing the hereditary 
transmission of traits injurious to the public. In language reminiscent of 
rhetoricians such as Roosevelt, moreover, the statute constructed women as 
the hereditary gatekeepers of the future population. A 1905 act of the Indi-
ana legislature laid bare the economic motives behind much of the Progres-
sive Era legislation. That law forbade a marriage license to be issued to "any 
male person who is or has been within five years an inmate of any county 
asylum or home for indigent persons, unless it satisfactorily appears that the 
cause of such condition has been removed and that such male applicant is 
able to support a family and likely to so continue" {Ind. Code Ann. §8365 
[Burns 1914]).35 Although in the postbellum era marriage was aggressively 
and almost invariably promoted as prima facie economically beneficial to 
society, progressives just as often understood the marriage of the unfit to be 
35. Several state laws laid specific emphasis on preventing unions that were likely to 
prove financially burdensome to the state. For the Michigan legislature, previous dependency 
served as conclusive evidence of the need for eugenic action: "No person who has been con-
fined in any public institution or asylum as an epileptiC, feeble-minded, imbecile or insane 
patient shall be capable of contracting marriage without filing in the office of the county 
clerk a verified certificate from two regularly licensed physicians of this state that such person 
has been completely cured of such insanity, epilepsy, imbecility, or feeble-mindedness and 
that there is no probability that such person will transmit any of such defects or disabilities to 
the issue of such marriage" (Mich. Compo Laws § 11367 [1915]). The Michigan law under-
scored the increased role that medical professionals, and scientific knowledge more generally, 
played in the production of a fit population. With its explicit focus on public institutions, it 
likewise suggests a significant expansion, or diffusion, of the loci of the operation of state 
power. 
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a potential cause of economic dependency. The apparent incapacity for 
male economic independence was deemed incompatible with fit citizenship. 
One of the first eugenic marriage laws to be tested in the courts was an 
1895 Connecticut statute forbidding the intermarriage of a man and 
woman, "either of whom is epileptic, imbecile, or feeble-minded ... when 
the woman is under 45 years of age" (Conn. Gen. Stat. §1354 [1902]). Vio-
lation of the law carried a penalty of up to three years imprisonment. In 
Gould v. Gould, Marion Gould sued her husband for a divorce because he 
had concealed his epilepsy from her prior to, and for four years following, 
their marriage. The court found that it was "within the power of the legisla-
ture, in the interest of public health, to prohibit marriages between . . . 
epileptic[s], when the woman is under forty-five years of age." In an explicit 
validation of the statute's eugenic underpinnings, Judge Baldwin wrote that 
it was a "matter of common knowledge" that epilepsy was "a disease of par-
ticularly serious and revolting character, tending to weaken mental force, 
and often descending from parent to child, or entailing upon the offspring 
of the sufferers some other grave form of nervous malady." One strategy of 
"guarding" against the "perpetuation" of such atrocities, the court contin-
ued, was "to forbid sexual intercourse with those afflicted by it, and to pre-
clude such opportunities for sexual intercourse as marriage furnishes" by 
imposing "a restriction of the right to contract marriage" (Gould v. Gould 
1905,244). 
In spite of the court's unequivocal endorsement of the act's eugenic 
motives, and in spite of what Judge Baldwin appeared to characterize as a 
legitimate exercise of police power, the decision in favor of the wife ulti-
mately rested on the construction of the Goulds' marriage as a fraudulent 
contract. "The prohibition of the Act of 1895," the court reasoned, "fast-
ened upon the defendant an incapacity which, if unknown to the plaintiff 
and fraudulently concealed from her with the purpose thereby to induce a 
marriage, made his contract of marriage in the eye of the law fraudulent."36 
Moreover, Gould suggests that although the court embraced the eugenic 
goals of the statute, the decision did not, as historian Michael Grossberg has 
written of the case, simply "indicate a willingness to retreat ... from the 
common law defense of contractual rights ... in reaction to perceived bio-
logical threats to public safety" (Grossberg 1985, 149).37 The case does rep-
36. Elaborating on its reasoning, the court drew a telling analogy between the case and 
the judicial practice of granting annulments for impotence, which I discussed earlier. The 
fraud committed by Roy Gould, Judge Baldwin wrote, is like that of the person who enters 
into the contract of marriage "knowing that he is incapable of sexual intercourse, and yet, in 
order to induce the marriage, designedly and deceitfully concea\[sl that fact from the other 
party" (Gould v. Gould 1905, 250). The parallel indicates plainly that hereditary fitness-the 
capacity for healthful procreation-had been added to the ability for sexual indulgence, as an 
essential public function of the marriage relation. 
37. Grossberg supports this conclusion by citing a passage from the contentious and 
somewhat reluctant concurring opinion of Judge Hamersley. 
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resent the court's willingness and desire to legally regulate the reproduction 
of the citizenry. It also demonstrates that the postbellum marriage relation 
was never truly "private," and further that the Progressive Era statutory 
"abridgments" of the common law of marriage did not necessarily produce 
an outright rejection of the language of contract.38 
Nuptial legislation prohibiting the marriage of the feebleminded, the 
insane, idiots, and imbeciles was frequently subjected to judicial review in 
suits for annulment on the grounds of mental incapacity. Though under the 
common law those deemed mentally incompetent had always been legally 
prohibited from marrying by virtue of their incapacity to consent, Progres-
sive Era legislatures concerned with the hereditary transmission of mental 
deficiency felt compelled to codify the disqualification. As one observer 
wrote in 1914 in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, in "a number 
of cases the prohibition is apparently made primarily on eugenical 
grounds-for the purpose of cutting off the bad germ plasm-to diminish 
the number of children who will eventually need state aid" (Smith 1914, 
365).39 
The judicial reception of the mental-deficiency provisions was mixed. 
In Schoolcraft v. O'niel, a New Hampshire court interpreted a 1915 statute 
prohibiting the marriage of "an epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded, idiot or 
insane person" when the woman is under 45, to mean that such a marriage 
"is voidable ... whether or not the fact of such insanity was fraudulently 
concealed from the husband." By declaring the questiofl of fraud "immate-
rial," and by resting its conclusion on the specific conditions of the statute 
and not merely the absence of capacity to consent, this decision made a 
clean break from the common law of nuptial contract (Schoolcraft v. O'niel 
1923,828). The same year, however, a Wisconsin court refused to void the 
marriage of a man who, though severely "mentally incompetent," was capa-
ble of consent. In so doing the court explicitly rejected what it understood 
to be the eugenic aims of that state's statute. "The test of mental capacity to 
enter the marriage contract," the court declared, "is not whether the parties 
are of sufficient mentality to measure up to the responsibility incurred by 
bringing offspring into the world, but the true test is whether there is under-
standing and mental capacity to realize what is being done and consenting 
thereto" (Roether v. Roether et al. 1923,576). 
Frequently, however, even those courts that refused to annul the mar-
riages of "mental defectives" expressed a clear consciousness of heredity is-
sues that they believed bore on the decision. In a suit for annulment on the 
38. See also Beshman v. Beshman 1919, in which the court found that in the absence of a 
statute prohibiting the marriage of epileptics, or proof of fraud of contract, epilepsy cannot be 
held to be grounds for annulment. This conclusion likewise suggests that in spite of the gener-
ally friendly judicial reception of the eugenic marriage law, the policing of heredity remained 
an uneven amalgam of statute and contract. 
39. See also Vernier 1931, 171. 
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grounds that a man allegedly concealed a "taint of hereditary insanity," for 
example, a New Jersey court declined to dissolve the union because there 
was "no doubt of the husband's mental capacity to marry at the time of the 
marriage." The court then went to great lengths to demonstrate, however, 
that although the defendant was presently a lunatic there was no compel-
ling evidence that his affliction was hereditary, and that it would have thus 
"fallen to his offspring" (Allan v. Allan 1915,364).40 Though Progressive 
Era courts did not always act in strict adherence to the eugenic marriage 
statutes, they nevertheless frequently justified their decisions on eugenic 
grounds. Judicial decision making in these cases often remained a strategic 
balancing act between the desire to preserve marriages in the interest of 
social stability, and an appreciation of the eugenic goals of the restrictive 
statutes. For the bench, too, the prevailing public policy of marriage had 
shifted considerably, though by no means definitively, from a near-universal 
promotion of the nuptial union in the postbellum era, to a more "guarded" 
conception of marriage as an instrument in the hereditary governance of the 
population. 
A 1915 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Peterson v. Widule, provides an 
excellent illustration of this point. The case tested the constitutionality of a 
1913 statute requiring that to be granted a marriage license a man had to 
first obtain a physician-issued certificate documenting that he was free from 
venereal disease.41 Though at that time eight states already had laws prohib-
40. See also Meekins v. Kinsella, in which a New York court held that a woman's prob-
able "hereditary predisposition" to idiocy was insufficient ro annul her marriage because in 
spite of her frequent "delusions," on the "evening of the wedding" she, in the words of one 
witness, "knew what she was about" (Meekins v. Kinsella et al. 1912,808,807). The court went 
on to justify the decision, however, by pointing to the improbability that the marriage would 
result in the birth of a child. If future offspring were likely, the court implied, woman's capac-
ity for consent might have been given less weight. 
41. The Progressive Era regulation of venereal disease through marriage was considered, 
for all intents and purposes, a "eugenic" measure. Prince Morrow, the most outspoken and 
influential advocate of legal action toward the elimination of venereal disease, argued that 
VO was a vastly underrecognized factor in the "depopulation" and "degeneration of the race." 
Gonorrhea, he warned, destroyed the "reproductive capacity of the woman," and while 
syphilis didn't "impair the power of procreation," it was nevertheless, "from the point of view 
of race perpetuation ... directly antagonistic to the intention of marriage" because "even 
when syphilis does not destroy the product of conception," Morrow wrote, "it transmits to the 
offspring a defective organization-the infant comes into the world a blighted being, lacking 
in development and physical stamina and stamped with inferiority." The sterility and physical 
deterioration wrought by venereal diseases, moreover, was not confined to the class of "vi-
cious and abandoned women who indulge in licentiousness and irregular living." Venereal 
diseases "approach with equal step the habitations of the poor and the palaces of the rich," 
respecting "no social position and recoil[ing] before no virtue." Its victims are "young and 
virtuous women, the idolized daughters, the very flower of womanhood. They are the women 
endowed by nature with all those physical attributes of health and vigor which fit them to 
become mothers of the race" (1904, 182, 22-23). 
The national epidemic of venereal disease, moreover, was a matter of pressing interest for 
the public welfare. "It is not to the advantage of the State," Morrow wrote, "to have as future 
citizens individuals who are stamped with inferiority and who bear the impress of degeneracy, 
physical, social or mental." Accordingly, Morrow urged strong legislation prohibiting the mar-
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iting the marriage of venereally infected persons, the Wisconsin act at-
tracted unprecedented attention and controversy because of its allegedly 
"coercive" character; namely, that it was relatively enforceable. By 1924, 8 
additional states had adopted provisions similar to Wisconsin's, and 37 more 
had defeated 90 such proposals (Hall 1925, 8, 58).42 
The decision in Peterson gave a resounding endorsement both to the 
authority of legislatures to aggressively regulate entry into the marriage sta-
tus and to the project of producing a fit citizenry through state governance. 
"The power of the state to control and regulate the marriage relation," de-
clared Judge Winslow, "and to prevent the contracting of marriage by per-
sons afflicted with loathsome or hereditary diseases, which are liable either 
to be transmitted to the spouse or inherited by the offspring, or both, must 
on principle be regarded as undeniable." "Society has a right to protect itself 
from extinction," Winslow declared, "and its members from a fate worse 
than death" (Peterson v. Widule 1915, 647 (1915).43 In contrast to the 
courts that a generation earlier had refused to validate the policy aims of the 
mandatory solemnization acts, Winslow's approval of the law's aims clearly 
endorsed the legislature's authority to enact statutes that superseded the 
common law of nuptial contract.44 
If Judge Winslow's decision in Peterson embodied the discourse of a fit 
citizenry and express~d what this essay has argued was becoming the prevail-
ing Progressive Era mode of nuptial governance, Judge Marshall's dissent in 
that case remained emblematic of an "older," yet still potent, public policy 
conception of the marriage relation. Marshall took issue most vigorously 
with Winslow's claim that the legislative regulations would, in effect, sim-
ply "safeguard," rather than "prohibit marriage." The statute, Marshall ar-
gued, represented instead the "legislative destruction or material 
impairment" of the "natural right" of marriage. His defense of that right is 
riage of the venereally infected, and requiring certificates of medical fitness to obtain a nup-
tial license (1904. 225. v). On the policing of venereal disease in the Progressive Era. see 
Brandt 1985. 
42. See Wis. Stat. § 2339 (1919). 
43. The "spouse" that the law was intended to protect was. of course, always the wife. 
The goal of the law. wrote the court, was to prevent the "transmission of ... venereal diseases 
by newly married men to their innocent wives." The explicit gender bias of the act was justi-
fied, reasoned the court. because "medical evidence ... corroborates what we suppose to be 
common knowledge. namely. the great majority of women who marry are pure" (Peterson v. 
Widule 1915, 648). The cause of protecting feminine purity. the court suggested. was fre-
quently inextricable from. and even necessary for, the perpetuation of a healthy citizenry. 
44. The same vision of public welfare that shifted governance of the formation of mar-
riages from the courts to state legislatures also elevated the medical profession to a position of 
unprecedented public authority. "If it be ... within the police power to prohibit a marriage" 
estimated to be injurious to society, the court argued. "the power to determine that fact must 
be vested in some competent body or person .... [as] the exercise of the police power does not 
wait upon the slow process of jury trials." That "competent person," the court wrote, was 
"every licensed physician ... of good moral character and scientific attainments." If the state 
was to wield the marriage relation skillfully as an instrument of governance, it required the 
expert guidance of medical science (Peterson v. Widule 1915,647.656.654). 
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reminiscent of the public policy pursuits of postbellum defenders of nuptial 
privatism. The requirement of a certificate of health "imposes such an op-
pressive burden ... as to proving competency to enjoy the natural right of 
marriage ... as to discourage an institution which is absolutely essential to 
public Welfare." By destroying the common right of marriage, Marshall con-
tinued, "the tendency will inevitably be to promote immorality and social 
and racial retrogression" (Peterson v. Widule 1915,657,660). The marriage 
relation, he suggested, remained too necessary to the moral order of society 
to "guard," and thus restrict, in the manner proposed by the Wisconsin stat-
ute. Judge Marshall's dissent-his defense of the "right" to marriage, as well 
as his assertion that the institution was intrinsically socially beneficial-
demonstrates how·the transformation that I have argued for was often une-
ven, incomplete, and highly contested. 
As my discussion indicates, eugenic discourse was prevalent in the Pro-
gressive Era even among reformers whose larger approach to social reform 
was explicitly "environmentalist." There is a risk of overstating the hegem-
ony of hereditarian thought, as well as the erosion of hope for restoring the 
social and economic functions of the family. In fact, a good deal of Progres-
sive Era reform engaged the working-class family as a unit-albeit a sick and 
beleaguered one-and sought a wholesale reconstruction of its values and 
behavior.45 Indeed, this essay has demonstrated that for many social scien-
tists (such as Howard, Goodsell, and Parsons) and reformers (such as Dike), 
an explicitly eugenic understanding of marriage did not preclude a profound 
awareness of and commitment to addressing the social and industrial condi-
tions that contributed to the "degradation" of the poor. In the social diagno-
sis of many progressives, the biological degeneracy and environmental 
degradation of the urban population operated in tandem. Reformers simul-
taneously advocated checking the reproduction of the hereditarily unfit by 
tightening the legal controls of the inception of marriage; strengthening 
state surveillance of, and intervention into, already existing families 
through, for example, the juvenile courts and the discretionary administra-
tion of mothers' pensions; and passing legislation to improve the hours, 
wages, and conditions of labor for industrial workers.46 
45. See, for example, Polsky 1991; Gordon 1988. By the Progressive Era, it should be 
noted, the mid-nineteenth-century philanthropic preference for separating children from the 
influence of the pauperized parents had largely disappeared. See Katz 1986, 103-9. 
46. In his study of the Chicago municipal courts in the early twentieth century, Michael 
Willrich has convincingly demonstrated that frequently "eugenic jurisprudence" and "en-
vironmentalism" were not necessarily strict ideological commitments, but rather interdepen-
dent approaches to governance with the shared enterprise of extending "the reach of 
government institutions into the everyday lives of urban working-class populations" (1998, 
71). 
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CONCLUSION: THE RACING OF DEPENDENCY AND 
THE GENDERING 0F GOVERNANCE 
This essay has argued that in the years between 1870 and 1920 there 
was a marked transformation in how nuptial reformers, the literate public, 
legislators, and judges understood the most vital social functions of the mar-
riage relation. First, a profound change occurred both in popular and "offi-
cial" conceptions of the urban poor and working-class citizenry-from a 
society largely contained within and governed by economically self-suffi-
cient and morally virtuous family units, to a more individuated "population" 
characterized by pauperism, dependency, menacing ethnic heterogeneity, 
gender transgression, and immorality. Marriage was consequently trans-
formed from an intrinsically beneficial institution to a potential source of 
biological unfitness. It was recast in law from a relation that ought to be 
consciously promoted by the state into an instrument wielded by the police 
power in its discretionary governance of social reproduction. Through the 
exclusion of those whom the state deemed unfit for procreation, public dis-
course and law conspired to help define the fit citizen and thus the contours 
of the "normal." 
This process involved, I have suggested, the discursive and legal inter-
play of values and concerns about household independence, pauperism, gen-
der, ethnicity, heredity, and citizenship. Though a more precise and fully 
elaborated account of the historical relationship between these discourses 
remains a task for another time, the foregoing discussion has a number of 
significant implications. If the regulatory transformation I have described 
has an explanatory "starting point," it is the historically potent model of the 
morally self-regulating, economically independent, single-male-breadwinner 
family-a model that embodied the complementary ideologies of both polit-
ical economy and gender. 
I have argued that in the last third of the nineteenth century, the !'cri-
sis of pauperism" and the increasing visibility of women, and particularly 
married women, in the wage labor force, among many other developments, 
were profoundly unsettling precisely because they contradicted the prevail-
ing model of household independence. As reformers and policymakers 
groped to diagnose and remedy the problem, they seized on explanations 
that avoided the conclusion that the ideal they valued so highly had be-
come hopelessly anachronistic in an age of industrial wage labor. As a way 
of reconciling the contradiction between the ideal of household indepen-
dence and the reality of the late-nineteenth-century industrial economy, 
many observers pointed to the apparent "foreignness" of the increasingly 
immigrant wage-earning class that was allegedly failing the test of economic 
self-sufficiency and moral virtue. This choice in tum contributed to the 
increasing racialization of a class of immigrant laborers whose ethnic differ-
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ence was in many cases already marked by language and culture. That no-
tion of racial difference-or more precisely, deficiency-served as a 
palatable explanation for why so many families seemed unable to get their 
economic houses in order. It was within this context that hereditarian 
thought gained currency and helped to fuel the racialization of the danger-
ous classes by providing late-nineteenth-century reformers and policymakers 
with a "neutral," "scientific" language with which to simultaneously rein-
force and depoliticize social and racial hierarchy. 
Gender likewise helped to mediate the contradiction between the ideal 
of the independent, single-breadwinner family and the reality of the work-
ing-class household economy. Nuptial reformers frequently characterized 
the rise of women's wage labor and the failure of male providership as a 
matter of gender transgression rather than a consequence of the reorganiza-
tion of labor under industrial capitalism. They were in general much more 
prepared to worry vociferously about the moral peril posed to women by the 
promiscuous mixing of the sexes on the shop floor than they were able to 
recognize that the (male) family wage had become an anachronism for 
many urban working-class households. Again, their diagnoses located the 
source of society's ills in the transgressive behavior of particular individu-
als-this time wage-earning women and their emasculated husbands. 
These ideological "containment strategies," moreover, appear to have 
contributed to the emergence of a set of priorities of social normalization 
that placed women in a strategically vital role in the governance of the 
polity. A number of state and federal "materna list" social policies-ranging 
from mothers' and widows' pensions, to the creation of the u.s. Children's 
Bureau, to protective labor legislation for women workers-understood the 
family, and particularly women, as part of a strategy of gqvernance aimed at 
a culturally and/or racially "foreign" citizenry (Mink 1995; Sapiro 1990; Pol-
sky 1991). In spite of the fact that (or perhaps precisely because) large num-
bers of women were gaining unprecedented access to the public sphere-
through their increasing presence in the wage labor force, expanded oppor-
tunities in higher education and the professions, the campaign for suffrage, 
and social reform work-Progressive Era social welfare policies constructed 
"motherhood" as the cornerstone of women's civic identity.47 By 
fore grounding the hereditary and ethnocultural dimensions of parenting, 
both the discourse of hereditary gatekeeping surrounding the eugenic mar-
riage laws and the materna list social policies that made cash payments to 
poor and immigrant mothers contingent on cultural assimilation helped 
construct a modernized version of republican motherhood. This model was 
no longer rooted in the beleaguered ideology of separate spheres, but in the 
47. On the increasing public presence of women in the ProgreSSive Era, see Peiss 1986; 
Meyerwitz 1988; Kessler-Harris 1982. On the Progressive Era women's suffrage campaign, see 
Cott 1988. 
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national project of reproducing a fit cItizenry. Both the public policy of 
marriage and some of the most ambitious Progressive Era state-building ini-
tiatives rested on a radically transformed understanding of the polity as an 
individuated population whose relation to the state was frequently mediated 
by, though no longer reducible to, the family. 
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